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ARTICLES 
CONTRACTS, CAUSATION, AND CLARITY 
Daniel P. O'Gorman* 
Contract-law remedies start with the assumption that an injured party should be 
fully compensated for all losses caused by the breach.1 As in tort law, however,· 
difficult issues regarding the cause of an injured party's loss sometimes arise, 
including situations in which multiple factors might have caused the loss.2 And, like 
tort law, contract law is reluctant to apply the principle of full compensation when 
the loss was caused by multiple factors.3 
Multiple factors contributing to a particular loss often suggest the existence of 
principles competing with contract law's goal of full compensation. For example, 
the law seeks to avoid unlimited liability for losses caused by the breach (particularly 
if the loss was a remote consequence of the breach) to encourage parties to take 
·Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. J.D., New York University, 1993; B.A., University 
of Central Florida, 1990. The author is indebted to Dean Leticia M. Diaz for providing a research grant 
on behalf of Barry University School of Law, without which this Article would not have been possible, 
and to Dorothic Laguerre for research assistance. 
I RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The initial 
assumption is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for his actual loss."). 
2 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 731 n.9 (4th ed. 2004) ("[T]hc same problems of multiple 
causes and of intervening causes that enliven the law of torts also arise in connection with contract 
damages .... "). The multiple factors contributing to a loss arc known in tort law as the "causal set." 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 20!0). Multiple 
causes, however, should be distinguished from preemptive causes or duplicative factors, which occur 
when the breach causes the loss but subsequent events that did not in fact contribute to the loss would 
have caused the same loss (a "no worse oft" situation). Id. cmt. k. 
3 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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reasonable actions to reduce losses caused by breach, and to urge parties to disclose, 
during contract negotiations, any special circumstances that would cause the loss 
from breach to be greater than ordinarily expected. Accommodating the full-
compensation principle and these competing principles is the primary function of the 
rules of contract damages. 
Contract law furthers these principles that compete with the full-compensation 
principle not through a single doctrine, but through a general causation requirement4 
plus the three limitations on an award of damages: the limitations of certainty,5 
avoidability,6 and foreseeability,7 with each governing different aspects of 
causation.8 A problem, however, with treating causation issues under multiple 
doctrines is that courts and attorneys are sometimes confused about which doctrine 
applies, and doctrines are sometimes used in a manner that addresses a problem 
designed to be addressed by a different doctrine. This Article clarifies causation 
analysis in contract law and proposes a coherent framework for such an analysis. 
Part I discusses common situations in which a causation issue arises in contract 
cases. Part 11 discusses the role each of the three limitations on contract damages 
plays in causation analysis. Part III proposes a coherent framework for analysis. Part 
IV is a brief conclusion. 
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that an 
injured party has a right to damages for losses "caused" by the breach). 
5 See id. § 352 ("Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be 
established with reasonable certainty."). 
6 See id. § 350 ("[D]amages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without 
undue risk, burden or humiliation .... The injured party is not precluded from recovery ... to the extent 
that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss."). 
7 See id. § 351 (I) ("Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to 
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made."). 
8 See, e.g., LL. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE 
L.J. 373, 375 (1937) ("What is principally revealed in the actual application of the standard of certainty 
is a judicial disinclination to impose on the defendant liability for those injurious effects of his breach 
which do not result 'directly,' but are due to the internal structure of the plaintiff's business. This 
disinclination finds a number of distinct doctrinal formulations, of which the requirement of 'certainty' is 
only one, the others being the test of foreseeability (Hadleyv. Baxendale) .... " (footnote omitted)). 
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I. SITUATIONS IN WHICH MULTIPLE FACTORS CONTRIBUTE 
TOA LOSS 
Although situations involving multiple factors contributing to a loss are most 
commonly associated with the law of torts, multiple factors can contribute to a loss 
flowing from the breach of a contract.9 Losses caused by a factor in addition to the 
breach can be divided into different categories based on (1) the source of the cause, 
i.e., whether the additional factor was caused by the injured party (what can be called 
an intrinsic cause) or, rather, by a third party or an act of nature (what can be called 
an extrinsic cause); (2) the timing of the cause, i.e., whether the additional factor 
existed at the time of contract formation (what can be called an existing cause), 
occurred after contract formation but before breach (what can be called an interim 
cause), or occurred after breach (what is called an intervening cause);10 and (3) the 
contribution the factor played in the loss, i.e., whether the breach was a necessary 
but insufficient cause of the loss, a sufficient but unnecessary cause of the loss, or a 
necessary and sufficient cause of the loss.11 
The following cases provide examples of these different types of causation 
scenarios. They also show that causation issues in contract law are more common 
than one might expect. 
A contributing factor caused by the injured party and existing at the time of 
contract formation (an intrinsic, existing cause) was involved in the celebrated case 
of Hadley v. Baxendale. 12 In Hadley, a carrier breached a contract to deliver a 
miller's broken crankshaft to an engineer within a specified number of days, causing 
lost profits to the miller because the crankshaft operated the mill and the engineer 
needed the broken crankshaft as a model to make a replacement. 13 Although the 
carrier's breach of contract was a factor in the miller's lost profits, so was the miller's 
failure to keep a spare crankshaft on hand.14 Thus, the injured party's actions (or 
9 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2. 
10 See Intervening Cause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining intervening cause as "[a]n 
event that comes between the initial event in a sequence and the end result, thereby altering the natural 
course of events that might have connected a wrongful act to an injury"). "If the intervening cause is 
strong enough to relieve the wrongdoer of any liability, it becomes a superseding cause." Id. 
11 See David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 KY. L.J. 277, 281 (2005-2006) (discussing necessary and 
sufficient causes). 
12 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
13 Id. at 147. 
14 Id. at 151. 
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inactions), ex1stmg at the time of contract formation (failing to have a spare 
crankshaft), contributed to the loss occurring.15 
A contributing factor not caused by the injured party and existing at the time of 
contract formation (an extrinsic, existing cause) was involved in Johnson v. Healy. 16 
In Johnson, the defendant breached a warranty to properly construct the foundation 
of a house.17 The foundation was not suitable because of improper fill that had been 
placed on the lot some time before the builder had bought the lot.18 Thus, the loss 
was caused not only by the improper foundation, but the improper fill as well. 19 
A contributing factor caused by the injured party and occurring after formation 
but before breach (an intrinsic, interim cause) was involved in Lesmeister v. Dilly. 20 
In Lesmeister, the plaintiff entered into a contract for the construction of a grain 
storage building on his property.21 The defendants breached the contract by building 
a defective building, but during construction the plaintiff contributed to the loss in 
multiple ways.22 He dumped bushels of com on the cement slab where the frame was 
being erected, interfering with construction.23 Despite the fact that the frame was 
incomplete, he directed that the sides and roof be put on so the com could be covered, 
even though the heavy metal framework should have been assembled before the sides 
and roof were attached. 24 He also asked the builder to change its procedure for 
attaching side panels, preventing the building from being waterproof.25 
A contributing factor not caused by the injured party and occurring after 
formation but before breach (an extrinsic, interim cause) was involved in Point 
15 Id. at 151. 
16 Johnson v. Healy, 405 A.2d 54 (Conn. 1978). 
17 Id. at 55, 57. 
18 Id. at 55-56. 
19 Jd. 
20 Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983). 
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Productions A.G. v. Sony Music Entertainment, lnc. 26 In Point Productions, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant's breach caused it to go bankrupt, but evidence 
showed that after contract formation, the plaintiffs affiliated companies suffered a 
series of financial setbacks that also contributed to the plaintiff's financial 
instability. 27 
A contributing factor caused by the injured party after the breach (an intrinsic, 
intervening cause) was involved in Offenberger v. Beulah Park Jockey Club, Inc. 28 
In Offenberger, the defendant breached a contract for the sale oftrifecta tickets for a 
horse race, failing to provide the tickets for what turned out to be the winning 
combination.29 The plaintiff, however, after receiving some of the tickets he had paid 
for, left the ticket window without checking to determine if he had received all of 
them.30 It was stipulated that the plaintiff had "purchased a racing program which 
contain[ ed] a notice in bold letters advising ticket purchasers to make sure that the 
ticket issued is the number requested and stating that mistakes cannot be rectified 
after one leaves the windows."31 Thus, the plaintiffs failure to make sure he had 
received all of the tickets contributed to the loss occurring.32 
A contributing factor not caused by the injured party and occurring after breach 
(an extrinsic, intervening cause) was involved in Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto 
Alarm.33 In Lenox, the defendant allegedly breached a contract by negligently 
installing a car alarm. 34 The plaintiff was in the business of selling jewelry, and the 
alarm was installed in the car of one of its salespersons.35 A thiefbroke into the car 
26 Point Prods. A.G. v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 336 (S.D.N.Y.), opinion amended on 
reconsideration, 2002 WL 31856951 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2002). 
27 Id. at 339-40. 
28 See Offenberger v. Beulah Park Jockey Club, Inc., No. 79AP-471, 1979 WL 209570 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 28, 1979). 
29 Id. at *l-2. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at *I. 
32 Id. 
33 Lenox, Inc. v. Triangle Auto Alarm, 738 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. 111. 1990). 
34 Id. at 264. 
35 Id. 
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and stole $125,000 worth of jewelry.36 Thus, the loss was caused not only by the 
defective car alarm, but by the thief breaking into the car.37 
With respect to the contribution that the breach played in the loss, a breach is a 
necessary but insufficient cause of the loss when, had the breach not occurred, the 
loss would not have occurred, but another factor was also necessary for the loss to 
occur. For example, in Hadley, the loss would not have occurred but for the carrier's 
breach, but the miller's lack of a spare crankshaft was also necessary. A breach is a 
sufficient but unnecessary cause when it alone would have caused the loss, but 
another factor would have caused the loss anyway. For example, in California and 
Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, lnc.,38 the defendant and a third party each failed 
to timely provide the plaintiff with a necessary portion of an integrated tug barge.39 
The defendant's breach was itself sufficient to cause the loss, but the loss would have 
occurred anyway because the third party also failed to provide a necessary portion 
of the tug barge.40 When there are such multiple sufficient causes, the situation is 
referred to as a case of"overdetermined harm.''41 A necessary and sufficient cause is 
when the breach alone would have caused the loss, but there was another factor that 
contributed to the loss but was not itself sufficient to cause the loss. For instance, if 
in Point Productions the injured party's bankruptcy would have been caused by the 
defendant's breach alone, but other factors contributed to the injured party's weak 
financial condition, though they alone would have been insufficient, the breach 
would have been a necessary and sufficient cause of the loss. 
II. THE DIFFERENT ROLES IN CAUSATION ANALYSIS PLAYED 
BY THE THREE LIMITATIONS ON CONTRACT DAMAGES 
As previously noted, contract law does not address causation issues within a 
single doctrine. Rather, the general causation requirement42 plus each of the 
36 Id. The case also involved a contributing factor by the plaintiff, which was keeping $125,000 worth of 
jewelry in the car. 
37 Id. 
38 Cal. & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), amending opinion on 
denial of rehearing, 811 F.2d 1264 (1987). 
39 Id. at 1435. 
4fJ Id. 
41 RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS: PHYS. &EMOT. HARM§ 27 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that an 
injured party has a right to damages for losses "caused" by the breach). 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) •DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2017.472 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
CONTRACTS, CAUSATION, AND CLARITY 
PAGE I 279 
limitations on an award of damages-the requirements of certainty,43 mitigation,44 
and foreseeability45-govem different aspects. This section discusses the role each 
plays in the causation analysis. Before doing so, however, the importance of the 
causation analysis is demonstrated with a discussion of contract law's rejection of 
the principle of apportionment. 
A. Failure to Apportion Damages 
In contract law, most courts hold that there is no apportionment of 
responsibility for a loss,46 even if the injured party contributed in some measure to 
the loss.47 Contract law has also rejected equitable indemnification as a method of 
apportioning damages between multiple parties who contributed to a loss.48 As stated 
in Corbin on Contracts: 
In all cases involving problems of causation and responsibility for harm, a good 
many factors may have united in producing the result; the plaintiffs total injury 
may have been the result of many factors in addition to the defendant's ... breach 
of contract. Must the defendant pay damages equivalent to the total harm suffered? 
Generally, the answer is Yes, even though there were contributing factors other 
than his own conduct. Must the plaintiff show the proportionate part played by the 
defendant's breach of contract among all the contributing factors causing the 
43 See id. § 352 ("Damages arc not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be 
established with reasonable certainty."). 
44 See id. § 350 ("[D]amagcs arc not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without 
undue risk, burden or humiliation ... [t]he injured party is not precluded from recovery [however] to the 
extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss."). 
45 See id. § 351 (I) ("Damages arc not recoverable for Joss that the party in breach did not have reason to 
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made."). 
46 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 999 (1964); see also David H. Fisk & R. Carson Fisk, 26-SPG 
CONSTRUCTION LAW 23 (2006) ("When a plaintiff's cause of action arises from breach of contract, the 
majority of courts today will not apply a comparative causation analysis, whereby the amount of 
recoverable damages is apportioned according to each party's percentage of fault."). 
47 Stop Loss Ins. Brokers v. Brown & Toland Med. Group, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609, 619--23 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (Pollack, J., concurring); James S. Schenck, IV & Kelli E. Goss, Liability for Construction Defects 
That Result from Multiple Causes, 9 J. AM. COLL. CONSTR. LAW. 45, 49 (2015) ("The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts docs not directly address apportionment of liability among several defendants for 
harm caused by breaches of separate contracts."). 
48 Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619-23 (Pollack, J ., concurring). 
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injury, and must his loss be segregated proportionately? To these questions the 
answer is generally No.49 
Thus, the general rule is that a defendant whose breach causes a loss is responsible 
for the entire loss, even if other factors contributed to the loss. 50 
There have been, however, some exceptions. For example, some courts have 
apportioned liquidated damages when the owner in a construction project contributed 
to the builder's delay.51 Some courts have also permitted a claim for contribution 
from another party who contributed to the injured party's loss.52 Scholars have also 
advocated for apportioning liability based on degree of fault. 53 But, as stated by one 
court: 
To permit apportionment of liability ... arising solely from breach of contract 
would . . . do violence to settled principles of contract law which limit a 
contracting party's liability to those damages that are reasonably foreseeable at 
the time the contract is formed .... Nothing prevented [the defendant] from 
negotiating for protection from liability in its contract with the [plaintiff]. Having 
neglected to do so, it may not now be heard to complain that it is exposed to a 
claim for damages. 
Nor are we persuaded that we should create a common-law right of 
contribution in contract actions .... [T]he need to liberalize the inequitable and 
harsh rules that once governed contribution among joint tort-feasors ... are not 
49 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 999 (1964). 
50 See, e.g., Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 613 F. Supp. 514, 532 (W.D. Mo. 1985) ("The rule 
to be applied ... is ... the ordinary contracts rule applicable to damages involving multiple causes: that 
if the defendant's breach or fault was a 'substantial factor' in causing the injury, the defendant will bear 
full responsibility for it even though there were other, contributing causes .... The fact that ... other 
parties may also have played some part in connection with the problem is immaterial."), aff'd, 813 F.2d 
186 (8th Cir. 1987). 
51 Jasper Constr. v. Foothill Junior Coll. Dist., 153 Cal. Rptr. 767, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), disapproved 
of on other grounds, Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. Great Am. Ins., 49 Cal. 4th 739 (Cal. 2010). See 
generally Rocky Unruh & John Worden, Liquidated Damages for Delay in Completion of Commercial 
Construction Projects: Are they Recoverable by the Owner When the Owner Contributes to the Delay?, 
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I (1993). 
52 18 C.J.S. CONTRIBUTION§ 10. 
53 John Barclay Phillips, Out with the Old: Abandoning the Traditional Measurement of Contract 
Damages fora System of Comparative Fault, 50 ALA. L. REV. 911, 926 (1999); see generally Ariel Porat, 
A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1397 (2009). 
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pertinent to contract matters. Parties to a contract have the power to specifically 
delineate the scope of their liability at the time the contract is formed. Thus, there 
is nothing unfair in defining a contracting party's liability by the scope of its 
promise as reflected by the agreement of the parties. Indeed, this is required by 
the very nature of contract law, where potential liability is determined in advance 
by the parties.54 
Thus, the failure of many courts to apportion damages in contract cases when there 
are multiple factors contributing to a loss makes contract law's causation rules in a 
sense more important than those in tort law. The following section discusses how 
contract law analyzes causation issues. 
B. Different Doctrines Governing Causation Issues 
The traditional remedy for the breach of a contract is an award of money, rather 
than specific performance. 55 The award of damages is designed to protect the injured 
party's so-called expectation interest,56 "which is his interest in having the benefit of 
the bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the 
contract been performed."57 Thus, an injured party is entitled to recover from the 
breaching party, so-called expectation damages.58 Making such an award the 
standard remedy seeks to encourage parties to rely on their contracts.59 
Contract law has a general causation requirement providing that a loss can only 
be recovered if the breach "caused" the loss.60 Additionally, there are three 
limitations on the recovery of expectations damages: the requirements of certainty, 
avoidability, and foreseeability.61 As discussed below, each of these doctrines plays 
a distinct role in a causation analysis. 
54 Bd. ofEduc. v. Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 517 N.E.2d 1360, 1364--65 (N.Y. 1987). 
55 RESTATEMENT(SECOND}OFCONTRACTS § 346 cmt. a (AM. LAW lNST. 1981). 
56 Id. § 347. 
57 Id. § 344(a). 
58 Id. § 347. 
59 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 730. 
60 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CONTRACTS § 347(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing that an 
injured party has a right to damages for losses "caused" by the breach). 
61 Hoang v. Hewitt Ave. Assocs., 936 A.2d 915, 934 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). 
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Before discussing each of the doctrines, several different issues should be 
recognized. The first is which party has the burden of persuasion, meaning which 
party has the "duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors 
that party."62 The second is the degree of proof necessary for the party with the 
burden of persuasion to discharge its burden, often called the standard of proof63 
There is a spectrum of standards of proof used in law, including (in ascending order 
of difficulty) reasonable suspicion, probable cause, preponderance of the evidence, 
clear-and-convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt.64 In a civil case, the 
standard of proof is typically preponderance of the evidence, 65 though in some 
situations it is clear-and-convincing evidence.66 The third issue is what must be 
proven to discharge the burden. 
1. General Causation Requirement 
The first issue to be addressed when factors other than the breach might have 
caused or contributed to a loss is whether the defendant's breach was the cause in 
fact of the loss.67 Although this general causation requirement is related to the 
certainty limitation, the two doctrines are technically distinct. The general causation 
requirement involves whether the defendant's breach caused the particular type of 
62 Burden of Persuasion, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10. 
63 Standard of Proof, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10 (defining standard of proof as "[t]he 
degree or level of proof demanded in a specific case, such as 'beyond a reasonable doubt' or 'by a 
preponderance of the evidence"'). 
64 Reasonable suspicion requires "[a] particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and 
articulable facts, for suspecting [the existence of the fact]." Reasonable Suspicion, BLACK'S LA w 
DICTIONARY, supra note I 0. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. United States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 7 (1989). Probable cause is "[a] reasonable belief in the existence offaets .... " 
Probable cause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10. Probable cause is a lower standard than 
preponderance of the evidence. Young Oil Co. v. Durbin, 412 So. 2d 620, 626 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
Preponderance of the evidence is "[t]he greater weight of the evidence .... " Preponderance of the 
evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10. Preponderance of the evidence is a lower standard 
than clear and convincing evidence. In re Guardianship of Chamberlain, 118 A.3d 229, 239 (Me. 2015). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "[e]vidcncc indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or 
reasonably certain." Clear and convincing evidence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10. Clear 
and convincing evidence is a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 
451, 464 (Minn. 1999). Beyond a reasonable doubt is beyond a "belief that there is a real possibility that 
[the fact does not exist]." Reasonable doubt, BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY, supra note I 0. 
65 Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1243 (N.J. 2006). 
66 Lyndhurst v. Beaumont, 170 N.E.2d 291, 294 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1959). 
67 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 731 ("There is, of course, a fundamental requirement, similar to that 
imposed in tort cases, that the breach of contract be the cause in fact of the loss."). 
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loss for which recovery is sought. The certainty requirement is about whether, 
assuming the breach caused the particular type of loss, the injured party can prove 
the amount of the loss to a reasonable certainty. 
A well-known example of a case involving whether the type of loss was caused 
by the breach is Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra.68 In Redgrave, an actress 
sued the Boston Symphony Orchestra ("BSO") for breaching a contract for her to 
narrate a play.69 She asserted that her losses included not only the money promised 
by BSO in exchange for her services, but the loss of other professional opportunities 
due to the negative publicity surrounding BSO's termination of the contract.70 The 
appellate court stated that this type ofloss could, with appropriate evidence, be found 
to have been a sufficiently foreseeable consequence of the breach.71 The court still 
denied recovery, except for one particular job, finding that she had failed to prove 
that BSO's breach, rather than other factors (such as the actress's political views), 
caused her to lose other jobs.72 Thus, even if she could have proved the loss was 
sufficiently foreseeable and proved how much she would have made from those other 
jobs, she could not recover because she could not prove that the breach caused the 
particular type ofloss for which she sought recovery (other jobs). 
Courts, however, are not consistent on the rule applied in contract cases to 
determine whether the type of loss was caused by the breach. Some apply a but-for 
68 Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988). 
69 Id. at 890. 
70 Id. at 891-92. 
71 Id. at 894. 
72 Id. at 896-900. 
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test,73 a position followed by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts;74 while others 
apply a substantial-factor test,75 a position followed by Corbin on Contracts.76 Some 
courts grant discretion to the trial court to decide which standard to use.77 
Before addressing each of these two tests, it is important to recognize that there 
would not be liability under either of the tests if it was clear that the breach played 
73 E.g., id at 893 ("The jury was given appropriate instructions to help it determine whether Redgrave had 
suffered consequential damages through loss of future professional opportunities. They were told to find 
that the BSO's cancellation was a proximate cause of harm to Redgrave's professional career only if they 
determined that 'harm would not have occurred but for the cancellation and that the harm was a natural 
and probable consequence of the cancellation."' (emphasis added)); Wright v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., 59 
F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (S.D. Ind. 1999) ("Traditional causation principles utilize an ex post test which 
requires courts to contemplate what would have probably happened 'but for' the defendant's breach of 
contract .... "); Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins., No. 10-223, 2012 WL 3150518, at *3 (D.N.H. Aug. 2, 
2012) ("[T]he plaintiff can recover contract damages 'only for loss that would not have occurred but for 
the breach.'" (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 198I))), 
ajf'd, 711 F.3d 21 (Ist Cir. 2013); Meadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman, 90 A.3d 219, 227 n.7 (Conn. Ct. 
App. 2014) ("[S]ome jurisdictions have recognized a 'but-for' causation requirement with respect to 
breach of contract actions."). 
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 347 cmt. c (1981). 
75 See, e.g., Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 613 F. Supp. 514, 532 (W.D. Mo. 1985), ajf'd, 813 
F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1987); Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp., 235 Cal. Rptr. 813, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987); Nelson v. Lake Canal Co., 644 P.2d 55, 59 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Tuttle/White Constructors, Inc. 
v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 385 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Indep. Mech. Contractors, 
Inc. v. Gordon T. Burke & Sons, Inc., 635 A.2d 487, 490 (N.H. 1993); Am. Sanitary Sales Co. v. Dep't 
of Treasury, 429 A.2d 403, 407 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Cammerer Farms v. Terra Int'!, Inc., 
No. CA91-02-020, 1991 WL 274322, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1991); Hunt v. Ellisor & Tanner, Inc., 
739 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). It has even been stated that the substantial-factor test is the 
general rule for contract cases. See Havens Steel Co., 613 F. Supp. at 532 ("[T]he ordinary contracts rule 
applicable to damages involving multiple causes [is] that if the defendant's breach or fault was a 
'substantial factor' in causing the injury, the defendant will bear full responsibility for it even though there 
were other, contributing causes."). 
76 See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 999 ("In all cases involving problems of causation ... the plaintiffs 
total injury may have been the result of many factors in addition to the defendant's ... breach of 
contract .... In order to establish liability the plaintiff must show that the defendant's breach was 'a 
substantial factor' in causing the injury."). There are two other tests that are sometimes used outside of 
contract law and tort law-the "any factor" test and the "sole or exclusive factor" test. See Anderson v. 
Standard Register Co., No. Ol-A-Ol-9102-CV00035, 1992 WL 63421, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. I, 1992) 
(discussing the but-for, substantial-factor, and "sole or exclusive factor" test), ajf'd, 857 S.W.2d 555 
(Tenn. 1993). The "any factor" test is used under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Robert 
Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the 
Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. I, 63--{)4 (1995) (concluding that Title VII's motivating-factor test is 
synonymous with an "any factor'' test). 
n Citizens Fed. Bank v. United States, 474 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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no role whatsoever in the loss that occurred.78 For example, assume a former 
employee breaches a nondisclosure agreement and discloses confidential 
information about his former employer to his new employer, and the new employer 
thereafter convinces a client to switch business from the former employer to the new 
employer. If the client, when deciding whether to switch business, did not consider 
the confidential information, then the breach did not cause the loss, and the former 
employee would not be liable under either test. 
a. But-for Test 
The but-for test for causation is a simple cause-in-fact test.79 Under the but-for 
test, "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the [loss] ifthe [loss] would not have 
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of 
the [loss], if the event would have occurred without it. "80 Under this test, the breach 
must be a necessary condition of the loss.81 This test requires a counterfactuaL. 
inquiry: "One must ask what would have occurred ifthe actor had not [breached the· 
contract]."82 The but-for test follows from the general rule of expectation damages 
that "[i]n a breach of contract action, the objective is to place the injured party in the 
position he or she would have been in but for the breach. "83 
78 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("In many cases the 
question before the court is whether the actor's negligence was in fact the cause of the other's harm--that 
is, whether it had any effect in producing it---or whether it was the result of some other cause, the 
testimony making it clear that it must be one or the other, and that the harm is not due to the combined 
effects of both. In such a case, the question, whether the defendant's negligence has a substantial-not 
merely negligible--effect in bringing about the plaintiff's harm, docs not arise if the testimony clearly 
proves that the harm is from a cause other than the actor's negligence. Indeed, the testimony often makes 
it clear that, if the defendant's conduct had any effect, the effect was substantial."); id. § 432 cmt. b, illus. 
I ("A statute requires all vessels plying on the Great Lakes to provide lifeboats. One of the A Steamship 
Company's boats is sent out of port without any such lifeboat. B, a sailor, falls overboard in a storm so 
heavy that had there been a lifeboat it could not have been launched in the sea then running. B is drowned. 
The A Company's failure to provide lifeboats is not a cause of B's death."). 
79 Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 861 (Mo. 1993) (en bane). 
80 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984). 
81 See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM§ 26 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("[A] 
factual cause can also be described as a necessary condition for the outcome."). 
82 Id. cmt. e. 
83 Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359, 1366 (Colo. App. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
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Professor David Robertson has proposed a five-step test for "but for" 
causation84 that, under a contracts case, would proceed as follows: First, the injured 
party identifies the particular loss for which he is seeking damages.85 Second, the 
defendant's breach that allegedly caused the loss must be identified.86 Third, one 
must imagine the state of the world if the defendant had performed as promised, but 
with no other changes.87 Fourth, one must determine whether the particular loss still 
would have occurred in the hypothetical state of the world identified in step three. 88 
The fifth and final step answers the question of whether there was but-for causation 
based on the conclusion reached in the fourth step.89 
The but-for test as the determination of responsibility for a loss has been subject 
to various types of criticism, some commentators asserting that it provides for too 
much liability, and others that it provides for too little. For example, the but-for test 
can be viewed as too lenient in that it would provide for liability even if the breach 
played a comparatively small role in producing the loss in comparison to other 
contributing factors, so-called butterfly-effect cases90 or overwhelming-force 
cases.91 This lenient approach to causation is reflected in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: "So long as the factfinder determines that any one of the alleged acts was 
tortious and a but-for cause of the harm, that is sufficient to subject the actor to 
liability."92 




88 Id. at 1771. 
89 Id. 
90 See Michael S. Moore, Causation Revisited, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 451, 506 (2011) (referring to such cases 
as "butterfly-effect cases"); John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The "But 
For" Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute 's Proposed Restatement 
(l'hird) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2683 (2003) (same). 
91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 36 reporter's note cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft No. l, 2005) (referring to such cases as "oveiwhclming force cases"). 
92 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM§ 26 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2010); id cmt. l 
("So long as the defendant's tortious conduct was more likely than not a factual cause of the harm, the 
plaintiff has established the element of factual cause."); id. reporter's note cmt. c (2010) ("That a party's 
tortious conduct need only be a cause of the plaintiff's harm and not the sole cause is well recognized and 
accepted in every jurisdiction."). 
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The but-for test, applied strictly, would also provide for liability in a situation 
in which the wrongful act, although being a but-for cause of the loss, did not increase 
the risk of loss, and was merely a fortuitous cause of the loss.93 Dean Prosser 
provided the following example in torts: 
[I]f the defendant drives through the state of New Jersey at an excessive speed, 
and arrives in Philadelphia in time for the car to be struck by lightning, speed is a 
cause of the accident, since without it the car would not have been there in time; 
and if the defendant driver is not liable to the passenger, it is because in the eyes 
of the law the negligence did not extend to such a risk.94 
Courts have invariably found the defendant not liable in such situations.95 In other 
words, there is no liability unless the wrongful aspect of the breach increased the risk 
ofloss.96 
Applying a but-for test as the determination of liability has been criticized, 
however, even when the wrongful act increased the risk of loss: "The event without 
millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and the mere fact of causation, as 
distinguished from the nature and degree of the causal connection, can provide no 
clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally responsible."97 
Thus, it has been argued that while but-for causation should be necessary for liability, 
it should not be sufficient, and it should solely be used as a rule of exclusion, 
excluding liability for losses that would have occurred even if there had been no 
93 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. I 09, 119 (1983) ("In an important class of cases, taking care would avoid an accident but 
liability is denied because, ex ante, the accident was not more probable on account of failure to take 
care."). 
94 KEETON ET AL., supra note 80, at 264. 
95 See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 180 (5th ed. 2013) ("If A is speeding and hits 
B, A can argue that she would have hit B even if she had been travelling at a lawful speed .... [O]ne could 
argue (however] that it was the speed with which A was travelling that placed A in the position on the 
road where she collided with B, warranting a conclusion that A's excessive speed was the cause. Courts, 
however, have almost invariably rejected this analysis and [found] the speed inconsequential."). 
96 See Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal and Economic, 
91 CHl.-KENT L. REY. 461, 461 (2016) ("Causation ofa legally recognized injury by the wrongful aspect 
of the defendant's conduct is a fundamental requirement, as a matter of interactive ('corrective') justice 
and actual practice, for the defendant's legal responsibility for such injury to an individual .... ") 
(emphasis added). 
97 KEETON ET AL., supra note 80, at 266. 
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breach.98 Strangely, however, many courts and lawyers incorrectly view the but-for 
test as being a difficult test to satisfy.99 As noted by one court, "[n]othing could be 
further from the truth."100 
The use of the but-for test has also been criticized for being too rigorous and 
enabling a defendant to unfairly avoid liability in certain situations. The first is a 
situation involving multiple, sufficient causes, situations in which two or more 
causes led to the loss, and either cause would have itself been sufficient (a case of 
overdetermined harm). IOI In such a situation, use of the but-for test would result in 
both defendants being absolved of liability, something considered to offend the 
retributive goals of law and to provide defendants with an unjustifiable windfall. I oz 
The second is when the defendant's breach causes the injured party to lose an 
opportunity for a benefit, but the opportunity of which the injured party was deprived 
would only have provided the injured party with a 50% or less chance of obtaining 
the benefit. I03 For example, ifthe defendant's breach caused the injured party to lose 
the opportunity at recovering from an illness, but the chance of recovery, even if 
there had not been a breach, was 50% or less, then the injured party cannot prove 
that "but for" the breach, the injured party would not have suffered the loss. 
The other type of criticism of the but-for test critiques its use in general. For 
example, commentators have argued that it is too difficult for a jury to imagine a 
counterfactual hypothetical, and asking the factfinder to do so invites the factfinder 
to be influenced by policy and value judgments about whether the defendant should 
be held liable. I04 
9s Id. 
99 See, e.g., Englewood Terrace Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 94 Fed. CL I 16, 124 (Fed. CL 2010) (stating 
it is more difficult to establish but-for causation than substantial-factor causation), ajfd in part, rev 'din 
part, 479 Fed. Appx. 969 (Fed. Cir. 2012); City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 
773, 795-96 (Tex. App. 1992) ("Austin asserts that the applicable burden of proof in contract cases is 
'substantial factor' causation and that 'but for' causation requires a higher burden of proof."). 
10° Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Mo. 1993). 
101 Rue, supra note 90, at 2705. 
102 Id. at 2706. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 2707-13. 
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b. Substantial-Factor Test 
The contours of the substantial-factor test for causation are difficult to state 
because it can be used either as an additional requirement to avoid liability in cases 
where the breach is only an insubstantial, de minimis factor in causing the loss 
(butterfly-effect or overwhelming-force cases) or a fortuitous cause, or as an 
alternative way to establish liability when the injured party cannot carry the burden 
of proving causation under the but-for test. 105 The origin of the substantial-factor test 
shows that it was intended to provide an alternative way to establish liability in 
situations involving multiple, sufficient causes (cases of overdetermined harm). 
The test's origin is typically traced to the tort case of Anderson v. Minneapolis, 
St. P. & S.S. M Ry. Co., decided in 1920 by the Supreme Court ofMinnesota.106 ln 
Anderson, the plaintiff's property had been damaged by fire, and the plaintiff alleged 
the defendant's train engine had emitted a spark that started the fire. 107 The defendant 
argued that another fire of unknown origin had also been moving in the direction of 
the plaintiffs property, and would have independently caused the damage even if 
the defendant's engine had not started the separate fire. 108 The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, however, approved a jury instruction that the defendant would 
nevertheless be liable as long as its conduct was a "substantial factor in causing 
plaintiff's damage."109 Prosser and Keeton explain that not requiring but-for 
causation in such a situation, and only requiring substantial-factor causation, is 
justified because 
it is quite clear that each cause has in fact played so important a part in producing 
the result that responsibility should be imposed upon it; and it is equally clear that 
to5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 20 I 0) ("The 
'substantial factor' rubric is employed alternately to impose a more rigorous standard for factual cause or 
to provide a more lenient standard."). 
106 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 
1921). 
107 Id. at 46. 
108 Jd. at47. 
to9 Id. at 47-48. 
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neither can be absolved from that responsibility upon the ground that the identical 
harm would have occurred without it, or there would be no liability. 110 
Because of the facts in Anderson, such cases have been referred to as "two fires" 
cases. 111 
The substantial-factor test gained stature when the American Law Institute 
included it in the Restatement (First) of Torts in 1934.112 As used in the Restatement 
(First) of Torts, the substantial-factor test appeared designed not only to provide for 
liability in situations involving multiple, sufficient causes as involved in Anderson 
(overdetermined harm or "two fires" cases),113 but to also screen out liability in 
butterfly-effect and overwhelming-force cases, where the defendant's contribution 
to the harm was a but-for cause but its contribution small. 114 The Restatement (Third) 
of Torts provides the following explanation of butterfly-effect or overwhelming-
force cases: 
While factual causes are not a matter of degree with regard to the outcome, in 
some cases, the inputs of the causes can be compared on a common scale. Thus, 
three actors may each contribute an equivalent dose of poison, all three of which 
are required to cause another's death .... In this respect, one may, in comparing 
the inputs, determine that one is smaller or even trivial by comparison to the 
11° KEETON ET AL., supra note 80, at 267; see also Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 
862--63 (Mo. 1993) ("We now reiterate that the 'but for' test for causation is applicable in all cases except 
those involving two independent torts, either of which is sufficient in and of itself to cause the injury."). 
111 Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 861. 
112 RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFTORTS § 43l(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
113 See id.§ 432 ("If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not 
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the 
actor's negligence may be held by the jury to be a substantial factor in bringing it about."). 
114 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM§ 36 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
("Section 431 of the first Restatement and of the Second Restatement required that tortious conduct be a 
'substantial factor' for it to constitute a legal cause of harm, which might be understood to prevent trivial 
or insubstantial causes from being sufficient to subject an actor to liability."); Rue, supra note 90, at 2690 
("[T]he drafters of the original Restatement seem to have been primarily concerned with protecting 
defendants from unlimited liability from the 'but for' results of their tortious acts."). 
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others, even though each is a necessary link in the causal chain that produced the 
outcome. 115 
Dean Prosser advocated for the substantial-factor test as a limitation on recovery in 
such situations, which he termed "troublesome" cases, providing the following 
example: "[W]here one defendant has made a clearly proved but quite insignificant 
contribution to the result, as where he throws a lighted match into a forest fire." 116 
The comments to the Restatement (First) of Torts support the conclusion that 
the substantial-factor test's purpose was, according to the ALI, in part to avoid 
unlimited liability: 
In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would 
not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. Except as stated in § 432(2), 
this is necessary but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence must also be a 
substantial factor as well as an actual factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm. 
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has 
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a 
cause, using that word in the popular sense in which there always lurks the idea 
of responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which includes 
every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not 
have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called "philosophic sense," 
yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would 
think of them as causes . 
. . . It is only where the evidence permits a reasonable finding that the 
defendant's conduct had some effect that the question whether the effect was 
substantial rather than negligible becomes important. 117 
There are frequently a number of events each of which is not only a 
necessary antecedent to the other's harm, but is also recognizable as having an 
appreciable effect in bringing it about. Of these the actor's conduct is only one. 
Some other event which is a contributing factor in producing the harm may have 
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM§ 26 reporters' note cmt. j (AM. LAW lNST. 
2010). 
116 KEETON ET AL., supra note 80, at 267--68; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. 
HARM § 26 reporters' note cmt. j (AM. LAW lNST. 2010) ("Another justification for the substantial-factor 
test is that it enables insignificant or trivial causes to be eliminated as causes. Dean Prosser advocated this 
purpose for the test with a hypothetical about an individual throwing a match into a forest fire."). 
117 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
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such a predominant effect in bringing it about as to make the effect of the actor's 
negligence insignificant and, therefore, to prevent it from being a substantial 
factor. So too, although no one of the contributing factors may have such a 
predominant effect, their combined effect may, as it were, so dilute the effects of 
the actor's negligence as to prevent it from being a substantial factor. 118 
Thus, the substantial-factor test was used in the Restatement (First) of Torts not to 
determine whether the defendant's conduct caused the injured party's loss in a 
descriptive sense, but whether, assuming the defendant's conduct was the but-for 
cause of the loss, the defendant's contribution was significant enough that he should 
be liable for the loss. 
In fact, the Restatement (First) of Torts identified important considerations in 
determining whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing 
about the loss, and none of them deals with causation in a factual sense.119 And the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1964, retained and replicated the 
substantial-factor test set forth in the Restatement (First) ofTorts.120 The comments 
reiterated that but-for causation is typically necessary, but not sufficient. 121 
Thus, the substantial-factor test of the First and Second Restatements of Torts 
is broader than but-for causation in the respect that it follows Anderson and provides 
for liability in a situation involving multiple, sufficient causes when the but-for test 
would not. At the same time, it is stricter than the but-for test because but-for 
causation is typically a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to liability. 122 
Importantly, however, some courts applied the substantial-factor test as an 
easier way to establish liability in all situations, not simply those involving multiple, 
118 Id. § 433 cmt. d. 
119 See id § 433 ("The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another 
important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to 
another: (a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the 
effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the 
actor's negligent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm; 
( c) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which arc in continuous and active 
operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces 
for which the actor is not responsible; (d) lapse of time."). 
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 431(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
121 Id. § 431 cmt. a. 
122 Id. 
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sufficient causes. 123 This meant that the injured party could establish causation by 
proving that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor contributing to the loss, 
even if the injured party could not establish it was a but-for cause of the loss, 
essentially using the substantial-factor test to lighten the injured party's burden of 
establishing causation in fact. 
Like the but-for test, the substantial-factor test has been criticized. In particular, 
it has been criticized for failing to provide meaningful guidance on what is meant by 
"substantial."124 In fact, the Restatement (Third) of Torts concludes that the 
substantial-factor test has "proved confusing and been misused," and thus adopts a 
but-for test as the sole test for factual causation, 125 except in cases involving multiple, 
sufficient causes.126 The reporter states: "In short, for purposes of determining 
whether a tortious act is a factual cause of harm there are no degrees of factual cause. 
A necessary condition for a relevant harm is a factual cause of that harm, without 
limitation. "127 
With respect to the misuse of, and confusion about, the substantial-factor test, 
the reporter noted that some courts have used it to apply a more lenient standard than 
"but for" causation, while others have used it to apply a stricter standard than "but 
for" causation.128 The reporter stated: 
[The substantial-factor test] may lure the factfinder into thinking that a substantial 
factor means something less than a but-for cause or, conversely, may suggest that 
the factfinder distinguish among factual causes, determining that some are and 
some are not "substantial factors." Thus, use of substantial factor may unfairly 
permit proof of causation on less than a showing that the tortious conduct was a 
123 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM§ 26 cmt. j. (AM. LAW INST. 2010) 
("[S]ome courts have accepted the proposition that, although the plaintiff cannot show the defendant's 
tortious conduct was a but-for cause of harm by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff may still 
prevail by showing that the tortious conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm."). 
124 Rue, supra note 90, at 2713. 
125 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) ("Tortious 
conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm 
when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct."). 
126 Id. § 27. 
127 Id. § 26 reporters' note cmt. j. 
12R Id. 
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but-for cause of hann or may unfairly require some proof greater than the 
existence of but-for causation. 129 
With respect to courts applying a stricter standard, the reporter notes that using the 
test in this fashion "appear[ s] to be doing scope-of-liability (proximate-cause) 
duty."130 The comment states that "[i]n the cases of a trivial dose that contributes to 
an overdetermined causal outcome, courts employ scope-of-liability (proximate 
cause) grounds to avoid liability for the actor responsible for such."131 Also, "the 
advent of comparative responsibility, comparative contribution, and modification of 
joint and several liability provide more refined means [than the substantial-factor 
test] to address such matters."132 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts addresses issues involving scope of risk under 
specific doctrines, rather than factual causation.133 Although the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts provides for an exception for trivial causes, 134 that limitation only applies 
when there are multiple, sufficient causes.135 If a trivial cause is a necessary condition 
of the loss, there is sufficient causation: "[T]he actor who negligently provides the 
straw that breaks the camel's back is subject to liability for the broken back."136 
129 Id. 
130 Id. ("[T]he author of the substantial-factor test, Jeremiah Smith, intended it to address the problem of 
proximate cause, not factual cause. See Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 
103 (1911). Smith envisioned the use of but-for as the standard for factual causation, while arguing that 
some additional limitation on liability also was required in at least a small class of cases. By the time of 
the fifth edition of the Prosser treatise (after his death), it had come around to the view that the substantial-
factor limitation was an evaluative limitation on liability rather than an aspect of factual causation."). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. § 36. 
134 Id. 
135 See id § 36 cmt. b ("The exception applies only when there are multiple sufficient causes and the 
tortious conduct at issue constitutes a trivial contribution to any sufficient causal set. ... The limitation 
on the scope of liability provided in this Section is not applicable if the trivial contributing cause is 
necessary for the outcome; this Section is only applicable when the outcome is overdetermined."). 
136 Id. 
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c. But-For and Substantial-Factor Test in Contracts 
The seminal case adopting the substantial-factor test for contract law is Krauss 
v. Greenbarg. 137 In Krauss, the War Department awarded an overall company a 
contract to supply a specified number of leggings to the Department. 138 The contract 
required certain quantities to be delivered at specified intervals, and provided for 
liquidated damages for any delays. 139 The overall company then entered into a 
subcontract with a webbing company to provide the webbing for the leggings by 
specified dates. 140 The webbing company, however, was late on its deliveries, and 
the overall company was late on its deliveries to the War Department, causing the 
overall company to be liable for liquidated damages under its contract with the War 
Department.141 
In a lawsuit by the webbing company against the overall company for money 
owed under their contract, the overall company asserted a counterclaim for breach. 
of contract and sought, as damages, the amount of liquidated damages incurred by 
the overall company under its War Department contract.142 The webbing company 
denied liability for the overall company's losses.143 The webbing company 
introduced evidence at trial tending to prove that its delay was not the sole cause of 
the overall company's delay in providing the War Department with the overalls, such 
additional factors including "a landlord's distress and eviction at the buyers' factory, 
a removal by the overall company of its plant, a shortage of eyelets necessary to the 
manufacture of the leggings, and excessive delay by the manufacturer even after all 
the webbing had been delivered."144 The trial court instructed the jury that the 
webbing company should be liable if, despite other contributing causes, "the 
'primary' 'real' 'main' 'chief cause of the overall company's delay was the webbing 
company's failure to deliver on time .... " 145 The trial court also ins_tructed the jury 
that the delay "had 'to be sufficient in itself to have delayed his (overall company's) 
137 137 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1943). 






144 Id. at 571-72. 
145 Id. at 572. 
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contract with the Government."'146 The jury returned a verdict in the defendant's 
favor on its counterclaim, and a judgment was entered. 147 On appeal, the webbing 
company argued that the instruction was erroneous, and that it could only be liable 
if its breach was the sole cause of the loss. 148 
The court of appeals affirmed the jury instruction, relying on the Restatement 
(First) of Torts and adopting the substantial-factor test: 
If a number of factors are operating one may so predominate in bringing about the 
harm as to make the effect produced by others so negligible that they cannot be 
considered substantial factors and hence legal causes of the harm produced. In that 
event liability attaches, the requisites of legal cause being shown, only to the one 
responsible for the predominating, or substantial, factor bringing the harm. 149 
The court, in adopting the substantial-factor test, stated that "[t]his problem is the 
same in tort and contract, though liability for consequences of an act is often carried 
further in instances where the defendant's liability is based on a tortious act."150 
The appellate court then held that the trial judge's instruction required no less 
than this standard and, in fact, might have been more favorable to the webbing 
company than it should have been (presumably referring to the requirement that the 
breach must have been a sufficient cause of the loss, not simply a substantial and 
necessary cause of the loss). 151 The Krauss court adopted (for contracts) the 
substantial-factor test as the Restatement (First) of Torts apparently intended it to 
be-as a requirement in addition to but-for causation to screen out liability in 
butterfly-effect or overwhelming-cause cases. 
Subsequent courts have followed Krauss and adopted the substantial-factor test 
as an additional requirement to but-for causation for the breach of a contract. 152 One 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 570. 
148 Id. at 572. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 572 n.4. 
151 Id. at 572. 
152 Parke State Bank v. Akers, 659 N.E.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Ind. 1995); Fowler v. Campbell, 612 N.E.2d 
596, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1191 (R.I. 1994). 
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court held that the plaintiff's loss must be proximately caused by the defendant's 
breach, and "'[p]roximate cause' requires ... that the defendant's conduct be a 
'substantial factor' in bringing about the harm which results, not simply be just 'a' 
factor or have a 'but for' causative relationship with the consequent damages 
claimed. "153 Another court held that "[ t]he [trial] court [in a contract action] correctly 
defined proximate cause [in its instruction to the jury], stating that it requires both 
'but for' causation and that defendant was the 'substantial factor' in causing 
plaintiff's loss."154 Courts applying the substantial-factor test in contracts have often 
recognized that the test, as adopted in Greenbarg, is stricter than a mere but-for test, 
and have even stated that the test is stricter in contracts than torts: 
Greenbarg defines a substantial factor as "conduct [having] such an effect in 
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause." Recognizing 
this definition is vague at best, the court [in Greenbarg] notes that a substantial 
factor in contract would require more culpability than in tort before a defendant 
would be liable. Phrased differently, an injury in contract would have fewer 
"substantial factors" than would the same injury in tort. 155 
But as in tort law, courts employing the substantial-factor test in contract law 
have mischaracterized it, sometimes indicating it is in general a more lenient test 
than but-for causation. For example, as with tort cases, courts have stated that the 
but-for test is a stricter test than the substantial-factor test, which, as originally 
conceived, is only true in a case involving multiple, sufficient causes. As stated by 
one court: 
The Federal Circuit employs one of two tests in order to determine causation: 
either the "substantial factor" or the "but for" causation test. The latter is 
considered the stricter test, as it requires the breaching party to be liable for 
153 Jn re 222 Liberty Assocs., 101 B.R. 856, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 
154 Wade v. Kessler Inst., 778 A.2d 580, 589-90 (N.J. App. Div. 2001), aff'd as modified, 798 A.2d 1251 
(NJ. 2002). One court held it is the injured party's burden to show that the breach contributed in a 
substantial measure to its damages, whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that some 
intervening cause contributed to the damages. Haven Assocs. v. Donro Realty Corp., 503 N.Y.S.2d 826, 
830 (App. Div. 1986). 
155 Zeller v. Griffith Aviation, Inc., No. CIV.A. 603-218-DCR, 2006 WL 1117678, at *7 (E.D. Ky. 
Apr. 25, 2006). 
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damages that but for its breach would not have occurred, while the former only 
requires that the breach be a substantial factor in the damages that resulted. 156 
Some of the confusion might stem from the erroneous belief that but-for causation 
requires the breach to be the exclusive cause of the loss, leading to the belief that the 
substantial-factor test must therefore be more lenient.157 Another court equated the 
"but for" test and the substantial-factor test. 158 
Courts have also used the substantial-factor test to avoid liability in fortuitous 
loss cases, such as Zetter v. Griffith Aviation, Inc. 159 In Zetter, an employment 
contract included a "temporary travel arrangement" clause,160 under which the 
employer promised to provide air transportation to the employee and his family 
aboard a "company owned or leased aircraft."161 The employer, on a particular 
occasion, provided air transportation to the employee's family on an airplane that 
was not company owned or leased, and due to pilot error, the airplane crashed, killing 
one of the employee's children and injuring the other family members.162 The 
employee sued for breach of contract, but the court held that because the crash was 
caused by pilot error rather than mechanical malfunctions on the plane, the 
employer's breach was not a substantial factor in the loss.163 Although the case can 
be viewed as holding that the type of plane played no role in the loss, it can also be 
viewed as holding that even if the loss would not have occurred had there been a 
156 Englewood Terrace Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 116, 124 (2010), a.ff'd in part, rev 'din 
part, 479 Fed. Appx. 969 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
151 See Citizens Fed. Bank v. United States, 474 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The proper standard, 
the government argues, is 'but-for' causation, under which the breaching party is liable only for those 
damages that it directly and entirely caused." (emphasis added)). 
158 See Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186, 201 (App. Div. 1980) ("[I]t follows that in order to shift 
the duty to repay from the corporation to defendant, he must show that he would have been repaid by the 
corporation but for defendant's nonperformance. That is to say defendant's failure to timely make a 
personal loan in the required amount must have been a substantial contributing cause of the corporation's 
bankruptcy."). 
159 Zetter, 2006 WL 1117678, at *I l. 
160 Id. at *I. 
161 Id. at *4. 
162 Id. at *I, *7. 
163 Id. at *7. 
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company owned or lease airplane (perhaps because there would have been a different 
pilot or different features of the plane), the breach did not increase the risk of a crash. 
Contract law has also addressed the issue of multiple, sufficient causes, at least 
with respect to breaches by multiple parties. Courts hold that, as in tort law, "in [a] 
case of concurrent causation each defaulting contractor is liable for the breach and 
for the substantial damages which the joint breach occasions."164 As stated by one 
court: 
Under the doctrine of concurrent breach of contract, "[w]here A and B owe 
contract duties to C under separate contracts, and each breaches independently, 
and it is not reasonably possible to make a division of the damage caused by the 
separate breaches closely related in point of time, the breaching parties, even 
though they acted independently, are jointly and severally liable." In other words, 
"[ w ]hen two defendants independently breach separate contracts, and it is not 
'reasonably possible' to segregate the damages, the defendants are jointly and 
severally liable."165 
Another court, however, rejected joint and several liability in such a situation, and 
instead apportioned liability based on the degree of fault of each defendant.166 
One area where courts have relaxed the but-for requirement is cases involving 
the loss of chance. For example, if a breach causes the injured party to lose the chance 
at a particular gain, but the chance of having received it would have been 50% or 
less even if there had not been a breach, the injured party cannot establish but-for 
causation. The injured party, however, is permitted to recover the value of the lost 
opportunity ifthe promise was conditioned on a fortuitous event.167 
164 Cal. & Haw. Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1986), amending opinion 
on denial of rehearing, 81 I F .2d 1264 ( 1987). 
165 lnsureOne Indcp. Ins. Agency v. Hallberg, 976 N.E.2d 1014, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (quoting 
Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Minn. 1983); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 
724, 740 (Minn. 1997)). 
166 /n re Emerald Casino, Inc., 530 B.R. 44, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 348(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981 ). 
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2. Reasonable Certainty 
With respect to proving the amount of the loss to a reasonable certainty, this 
requirement is similar to proving causation with respect to the type of loss. 168 But it 
is different in that it assumes that the type of loss was caused by the defendant's 
breach, but that the amount or extent of the loss is unclear. 169 Courts use this standard 
to help accurately measure damages.170 The issue is most commonly encountered 
when the injured party seeks a recovery of profits that would have been earned had 
the defendant not breached.171 It has been argued that this is "[t]he big issue in 
business litigation-the one the huge verdicts turn on .... "172 
To avoid undue speculation and thereby decrease the chance of a windfall, 
courts require the injured party to prove the loss (which under expectation damages 
includes the amount of gains prevented) to a "reasonable certainty."173 For example, 
in MindGames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co., the defendant allegedly breached a 
promise to market a new board game, but the court held that the injured party failed 
168 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 49 (6th ed. 2009) ("The certainty 
doctrine is ... in part about causation."). 
169 Id. at 497~98 (noting that once it is established that the breach caused injury, quantification is 
necessary); Finkelbcrg v. Luckett, 608 So. 2d 1214, 1222 n.4 (Miss. 1992) ("[I]t is well to bear in mind 
the distinction between the certainty required in proving causation in damages and that required in proving 
the amount of damages. Again, C.J .S. accurately states the latter rule and the distinction in the two: '§ 28-
Uncertainty as to Measure or Extent. Uncertainty as to the measure or extent of damages does not bar 
recovery. [headnote] The rule as to the recovery of uncertain damages generally has been directed against 
uncertainty as to the fact or cause of damage rather than uncertainty as to the measure or extent. In other 
words, the rule against uncertain or contingent damages applies only to such damages as arc not the certain 
results of the wrong, and not to such as are the certain results but uncertain in amount."'); Stevens Linen 
Assocs., Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[T]here is a distinction between proof 
of causation meaning proof that defendant's acts caused any harm to plaintiff at all and proof of the amount 
of damage .... "); Main v. State, 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 56, 58, 1965 WL 6400, at *2 (Ill. Ct. Cl. Jan. 29, 1965) 
("Although it is a well established maxim oflaw that damages, to be recoverable, must be actual, and not 
speculative or uncertain, a distinction has been drawn between uncertainty as to cause and uncertainty as 
to amount."). 
170 Doug Carleton, Note, Averting the New Business' Battle to Prove lost Profits: A Reintroduction of the 
Traditional Reasonable Certainty Rule as a Penalty Default, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1994). 
171 RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
172 Robert M. Lloyd, The Reasonable Certainty Requirement in lost Profits litigation: What is Really 
Means, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 11, 11 (2010). 
173 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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to introduce sufficient evidence to establish the amount of profits that would have 
been earned had there been no breach. 174 
Although the certainty requirement, like the general causation requirement, is 
about causation (a certainty issue is simply a type of causation question-how much 
loss did the defendant's breach cause?), it is useful to separate the broader question 
of causation into separate sub-issues to clarify the type of causation issue being 
addressed. Referring to the "causation" requirement when analyzing the type of loss 
and the "certainty" requirement when analyzing the amount ofloss helps identify the 
precise causation issue to be resolved.175 Although both deal with causation, the 
general causation requirement focuses attention on other possible causes for the loss, 
whereas the certainty requirement focuses attention not on other possible causes for 
the loss, but on the extent of the loss. Some courts state that the fact of loss must be 
established to a reasonable certainty, but once the fact of loss has been established 
the amount need not be proven to a reasonable certainty, something known as the 
"fact and amount rule."176 
Professor McCormick referred to the certainty requirement with respect to the 
amount ofloss as "probably the most distinctive contribution of the American courts 
to the common law of damages,"177 which is interesting because no one seems to be 
sure exactly what that contribution entailed. Although courts state that the amount of 
loss must be established to a "reasonable certainty,"178 courts disagree on what it 
means to prove a loss with "reasonable certainty ,"179 other than perhaps agreeing that 
174 See generally MindGames, Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000). 
175 Even commentators conflate the general causation requirement and the certainty requirement. For 
example, Professor Farnsworth discussed the "loss of chance" doctrine as a relaxation of the certainty 
requirement. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 804. It is, however, more appropriately considered a 
relaxation of the general causation requirement. In such cases, the injured party is typically deprived of 
an opportunity to receive a specified amount of money. While it is true that in a sense the injured party 
cannot prove to a reasonable certainty the amount of loss caused by the defendant's breach, the issue is 
more appropriately considered one of general causation-the injured party cannot prove that the type of 
loss was caused by the breach. 
176 Lloyd, supra note 172, at 29. 
177 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 124 (1935). 
17
" See Lloyd, supra note 172, at 12 ("Every United States jurisdiction has adopted the rule that lost profits 
must be proven with reasonable certainty."). 
179 See Tull v. Gundersons, Inc., 709 P.2d 940, 943 (Colo. 1985) ("[T]hcre arc conflicting views of the 
meaning of the reasonable-certainty standard .... "). 
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it means something less than beyond a reasonable doubt. 180 Specifically, there is 
disagreement whether the certainty requirement imposes a stricter standard of proof 
than the typical preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for proving damages in a 
civil action. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that courts have traditionally 
applied a standard of proof in contract cases stricter than in tort cases.181 Professor 
Joseph Perillo agrees, stating that although there is no satisfactory way of defining 
"certainty" or "reasonable certainty," they mean "that the quality of evidence must 
be of a higher caliber than is needed to establish most other factual issues in a 
lawsuit."182 He maintains that different levels of stringency are imposed based on 
whether the injured party is seeking general damages (less stringent) or 
consequential damages (more stringent), and that "the stringency of its application 
has tended to vary in different decades dependent upon the makeup and philosophy 
of the bench in a particular jurisdiction at a particular time."183 Professor Perillo's 
conclusion that the reasonable-certainty requirement is stricter than a preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard is supported by the definition of clear and convincing 
evidence, which is "[ e ]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly 
probable or reasonably certain."184 Perillo argues that "the standard of certainty, like 
180 See, e.g., Hardwick v. Dravo Equip. Co., 569 P.2d 588, 594 (Or. 1977) (Lent, J., specially concurring) 
("I must confess ... that I have no more idea what reasonable certainty means than I have as to the 
meaning of certainty. I would assume that it is some lesser quantum of proof than ... beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or to a moral certainty."). 
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 352 cmt. a (AM. LA w INST. 1981 ); see also FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 2, at 800; McHale v. Toplovich, No. 59729, 1992 WL 14403, at *4 (Ohio App. Div. Jan. 30, 
1992) ("As a general rule, an injured party cannot recover damages for breach of contract beyond the 
amount that is established by the evidence with reasonable certainty, and generally, courts have required 
greater certainty in the proof of damages for breach of contract than for a tort."). 
182 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 498; see also Lloyd, supra note 172, at 16 (referring to the possibility of 
requiring "businesses to recover lost profits only when they can prove with a great deal of certainty that 
but for the actions of the defendant they actually would have earned those profits" (emphasis added)). 
183 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 498; see, e.g., Tractcbel Energy Mktg. v. AEP Power Mktg., 487 F.3d 89, 
109 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that under New York law, there is a lower standard for proving the amount 
of general damages than for consequential damages). 
184 Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY, supra note 10 (emphasis added). Some 
courts fail to recognize that "reasonable certainty" must refer to the standard of proof, sometimes stating 
that the injured party must prove losses to a reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the evidence. See, 
e.g., Clean Fuel LLC v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 415, 420 n.5 (2013) ("[T]he merits ofa claim for lost 
profits concern whether the plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that ... a 
sufficient basis exists for estimating the amount of lost profits with reasonable certainty." (citations 
omitted)); Anderson v. Wade, 33 Fed. Appx. 750, 756 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he district court properly 
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the rule of foreseeability, is [thus] based at least partly upon a policy of limiting 
contractual risks."185 
Professor McCormick disagreed, maintaining that the reasonable-certainty 
standard is the equivalent of a probability (preponderance-of-the-evidence) 
standard,186 a position followed by Chancellor John Murray,187 some courts,188 and 
some treatises.189 Notably, Judge Richard Posner has stated that the reasonable-
certainty requirement is the standard "applicable to proof of damages generally."190 
Professor Robert Lloyd has argued that a court, when applying the reasonably-
certain test, decides "whether it is fair to award this much money on the basis of this 
much proof."191 He argues that 
[i]fthe term "reasonable certainty" were taken literally, the court's confidence that 
the estimate was accurate would be the only factor considered. But ... 
"reasonable certainty" is really code for "does the court think that, given all of the 
concluded that Anderson must show his damages to a reasonable certainty by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence."). 
185 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 499; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 177, at I 05 ("[11he standard of 
'certainty' was developed, and has been used, chiefly as a convenient means of keeping within the bounds 
of reasonable expectation the risk which litigation imposes upon commercial enterprise"); Lloyd, supra 
note 172, at 15 ("It has long been recognized that the economy cannot flourish when businesses arc afraid 
to enter into transactions because they fear an inadvertent breach will lead to a huge damage award."); 
Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1096 (2000) ("The restriction that damages be proved with reasonable certainty 
is applied with greater strictness in contract cases than in tort cases. Thus, the rule of certainty, like the 
rule of foreseeability, encourages entrepreneurial risk taking." (citation omitted)). 
186 MCCORMICK, supra note 177, § 26. 
187 See JOHN EDWARDMURRAY,JR.,MURRAYONCONTRACTS§ 122(a)(5th ed. 201 l)("Modcmcascs ... 
typically require no more than a preponderance of the evidence because the original certainty limitation 
has been modified to a requirement of only 'reasonable certainty."'). 
188 See, e.g., Strock v. USA Cycling, Inc., Nos. OO-CV-2285-JLK, 01-CV-2444-JLK, 2006 WL 1223151, 
at *6 (D. Colo. May 8, 2006); Florafax lnt'I, v. GTE Mkt. Res., Inc., 933 P.2d 282, 296 (Okla. 1997); 
Commercial Credit Corp. v. C. F. Schwartz Motor Co., 251A.2d353, 355 (Del. Super. 1969). 
189 See 22 AM. JUR. 2D DAMAGES § 341 (2016) ("The term 'reasonable certainty' with regard to the 
determination of damages means only that the fact that there arc damages must be more than merely 
speculative and only requires that the plaintiff meet the usual preponderance burden of proof .... " 
(footnote omitted)). 
190 MindGamcs, Inc. v. W. Publ'g. Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000). 
191 Lloyd, supra note 172, at 13. 
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circumstances, this plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to make it fair to 
award it the damages in question." 192 
In fact, it has been argued that "the standard of 'certainty' was developed, and has 
been used, chiefly as a convenient means of keeping within the bounds of reasonable 
expectation the risk which litigation imposes upon commercial enterprise."193 
One commentator has suggested that the reasonably-certain requirement could 
be used to preclude a recovery when the injured party was in a better position to 
avoid the loss.194 The same commentator has argued that the reasonably-certain 
requirement, if it imposes a strict standard on recovery, operates as a penalty default 
rule, designed to provide the injured party with an incentive to disclose the likely 
amount of loss from breach during contract negotiations and to encourage the use of 
liquidated-damages provisions. 195 
3. Avoidability 
Even ifthe type ofloss was caused by a breach and the amount of the loss can 
be established with reasonable certainty, recovery for the loss will still be denied if 
the injured party, through reasonable efforts, "could have avoided [the loss] without 
undue risk, burden[,] or humiliation."196 Known as the "duty to mitigate"197 or the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences, 198 the doctrine is similar to a contributory 
negligence standard, asking whether the injured party could have and should have 
avoided the loss.199 "The economic justification of such a rule is plain, for it 
encourages the injured party to act so as to minimize the wasteful results of the 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 MCCORMICK, supra note 177, at 105. 
194 See Carleton, supra note 170, at 1587 & n.47. 
195 See id. at 1608. 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
197 Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. CL 760, 803 (2013). 
198 24 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS§ 66:7, at 420 (Danny R. Veilleux ed., 4th ed. 2002). 
199 See Ychuda Adar, Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sisler Doctrines in 
Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 792 (2013) ("The ... rule states that a defendant is not 
liable towards a plaintiff for any loss resulting from the defendant's wrong (be it a tort or a breach of 
contract) if the plaintiff could and should have avoided that loss." (citations omitted)). 
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breach."20° Chancellor Murray states that the rule is premised on the interest of 
fairness. 201 The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.202 
Like the other doctrines discussed, the mitigation limitation is about causation, 
with the injured party's failure to avoid the loss a contributing factor in the loss. As 
Judge Cardozo wrote: 
What is meant by the supposed duty [to mitigate] is merely this: That if he 
unreasonably [fails to mitigate], he will not be heard to say that the loss ... from 
then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier [breach]. He has 
broken the chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is suffered 
through his own act. It is not damage that has been caused by the wrongful act of 
the [defendant]. 203 
The difference is that the mitigation doctrine only applies to intrinsic, intervening 
causes. "There is no need to mitigate until there is an actual breach of contract"204 or 
after learning or having reason to know that the other party's performance will not 
be forthcoming.205 
The mitigation limitation is not, however, "thought of as a consequence of a 
requirement of causation but a limitation under a 'mitigation' rule."206 In fact, one 
court stated that "[a] party that breaches a contract must not conflate mitigation and 
causation arguments, although failure to avoid a loss may bar recovery."207 Thus, 
like the causation and certainty requirements, this particular causation issue (injured 
20° FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.12, at 779. 
201 MURRAY, supra note 187, § 123(a). 
202 See Johnson v. Washington, No. 2:07cv204, 2008 WL 850690, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 12, 2008); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.12, at 780; PERILLO, supra note 168, at 507. 
203 McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 169 N.E. 605, 609-10 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, J., concurring); see 
also PERILLO, supra note 168, at 506 ("[A] party who has been wronged by a breach of contract may not 
unreasonably sit idly by and allow damages to accumulate. Such damages arc not proximately caused by 
the breach."). 
204 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 507 n. I 2. 
205 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.12, at 781-82. 
206 See id. § 12. I, at 73 I,§ 12. 12, at 779-80. 
207 Englewood Terrace Ltd. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. I 16, 124-25 (2010) (citation omitted), a.fl'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 479 Fed. Appx. 969 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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party's failure to avoid the loss after breach or repudiation) is treated as a separate 
category to focus on the particular issue involved. The distinction is based on timing 
and who is responsible for the cause. As explained by one court with respect to torts: 
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is to be distinguished from the doctrine 
of contributory negligence. Generally, they occur-if at all-at different times. 
Contributory negligence occurs either before or at the time of the wrongful act or 
omission of the defendant. On the other hand, the avoidable consequences 
generally arise after the wrongful act of the defendant. 208 
It has been noted that "[t]he application of mitigation principles in contract ... 
actions varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction [with] many courts 
disagree[ing] about what is to be proved."209 
4. Foreseeability 
Under the foreseeability limitation, a defendant is not liable for a loss that was 
not a sufficiently foreseeable consequence of the breach to the defendant at the time 
of contract formation.210 Information obtained by the defendant after formation does 
not expand the defendant's responsibility beyond those losses that were sufficiently 
foreseeable at the time of formation.211 The injured party has the burden of 
persuasion on foreseeability212 and is required to prove that the losses were 
sufficiently foreseeable by a preponderance of the evidence.213 The foreseeability 
requirement is similar to tort law's proximate cause requirement, in the sense that it 
tends to preclude liability for a loss when there were multiple factors that contributed 
208 Miller v. Miller, 160 S.E.2d 65, 74 (N.C. 1968) (quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D DAMAGES§ 31 (1965)). 
209 Neil W. Hamilton & Virginia B. Cone, Mitigation of Antitrost Damages, 66 OR. L. REV. 339, 369 
n.151 (1987) ("The application of mitigation principles in contract ... actions varies greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction .... For example, many courts disagree about what is to be proved and by 
whom with regard to the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages."). 
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
211 See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1975); MURRAY, supra 
note 187, § 12l(a), at 765 ("The foreseeability of probable consequences must be determined as of the 
time of contract formation. If additional knowledge comes to the promisor subsequent to that time, it is 
irrelevant."). 
212 See In re Partners Group Fin., LLC, 394 B.R. 68, 80 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008). 
213 See Ncr Tamid Congregation ofN. Town v. Krivoruchko, 660 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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to the loss, making the loss that occurred an unlikely consequence of the breach.214 
The widespread adoption of the foreseeability requirement is attributed to the 
previously discussed case of Hadley v. Baxendale, decided by England's Court of 
Exchequer in 1854.215 
Courts agree that the loss need not have been a necessary or certain result of 
the breach,216 that the type ofloss must have been sufficiently foreseeable rather than 
the mere fact ofa loss,217 and that the loss must have been a sufficiently foreseeable 
consequence of the particular breach that occurred.218 Importantly, however, like the 
certainty requirement, the foreseeability requirement can be applied with different 
degrees of strictness. 
For example, courts disagree on how foreseeable, at the time of contract 
formation, the loss must have been. Some courts require that the loss be a probable 
214 See Peter Linzcr, Hadley v. Baxendale and the Seamless Web of law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 225, 
228 (2005) ("Hadley is the contractual analog to proximate cause [in tort]."); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank 
Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale links up with tort 
concepts .... The rule is sometimes stated in the form that only foreseeable damages arc recoverable in 
a breach of contract action .... So expressed, it corresponds to the tort principle that limits liability to the 
foreseeable consequence of the defendant's carelessness." (citation omitted)). 
215 LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 406 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that the Hadley 
rule "was eagerly adopted in the states"). New York, however, had anticipated the Hadley rule fifteen 
years earlier in Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342, 342 (N.Y. 1839), and by the time of Hadley, the 
foreseeability limitation was already well-known in the United States. See Robert M. Lloyd & Nicholas 
J. Chase, Recovery of Damages for lost Profits: The Historical Development, 18 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 315, 
346 (2016). But in 1858, the New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 492-94 (N.Y. 
1858), four years after Hadley, stated that the foreseeability limitation was not the rule of decision in 
Blanchard, and "that opinion [Blanchard] became just another forgotten nineteenth century opinion." Id. 
at 351. 
216 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.14, at 795 (footnotes omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 351 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting that the Joss need not be a necessary result of the 
breach). 
217 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 683 F.3d 1330, 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("The Restatement and relevant treatises have uniformly set forth the relevant standard 
and make clear that a plaintiff must show that the type of damages arc foreseeable as well as the fact of 
damage."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The mere 
circumstance that some loss was foreseeable, or even that some Joss of the same general kind was 
foreseeable, will not suffice if the loss that actually occurred was not foreseeable." (emphasis added)). 
2IR See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 351 cmt. a(AM. LAW INST. 1981)("He is not ... liable 
in the event of breach for Joss that he did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a probable 
result of such a breach." (emphasis added)). 
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consequence of the breach,219 the standard adopted in Hadley220 and the Restatement 
(Second) ofContracts;221 others require a lower degree ofprobability.222 
Courts also disagree about whether the amount of the loss, in addition to the 
type of loss, must be sufficiently foreseeable. Some courts require that only the type 
of loss must be sufficiently foreseeable;223 others require that the magnitude of the 
loss also be sufficiently foreseeable,224 a position followed by the Restatement 
219 See, e.g., Core-Mark Midcontincnt Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 370 P.3d 353, 364 (Colo. App. 2016) ("Core-
Mark was required to prove that the loss was the probable, though not the necessary or certain, result of 
the breach. And in this context, probable means likely."). 
220 See Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151, 9 Ex. 341, 354 ("Where two parties have 
made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in 
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either [I] 
arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or [2] 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they 
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." (emphasis added)). 
221 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Damages are not 
recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the 
breach when the contract was made." (emphasis added)). 
222 See, e.g., Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Southern 
Pacific replies that it was as foreseeable that the goods were to be sold as that they were to be used. This 
contention proves too much because Hadley allows recovery for harms that should have been foreseen. 
The general rule does not require the plaintiff to show that the actual harm suffered was the most 
foreseeable of possible harms. He need only demonstrate that his harm was not so remote as to make it 
unforeseeable to a reasonable man at the time of contracting."); Robert M. Lloyd, Contract Damages in 
Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV. 837, 871 (2002) ("Although American courts have not been as liberal as 
British courts in applying the foreseeability requirement, a number of American courts have allowed 
recovery where it was clear that the probability of such damages being incurred was far less than 50%."). 
223 See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1456, 1474-75 (E.D. Va. 
1984) ("[T]he Hadley foreseeability test is to be applied to the kind, not the amount, of damage."), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1987); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 796 ("The magnitude 
of the loss need not have been foreseeable .... "); see also Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, 
Consequential Damages for Commercial loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 665, 708 n.193 (1994) ("Most authority addressing the issue has held that it is not a defense that the 
seller could not foresee the amount of the loss." (emphasis added)). 
224 See, e.g., Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc., 370 P.3d at 361 ("[T]he injury actually suffered must be one 
of a kind that the defendant had reason to foresee and of an amount that is not beyond the bounds of 
reasonable prediction .... The rule merely requires that the injury must be one of such a kind and amount 
as a prudent person would have realized to be a probable result of the breach." (quoting JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 56.7, at 108 (rev. ed. 2005))); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC, 683 F.3d 1330, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[T]hc injury 
actually suffered [still] must be ... an amount that is not beyond the bounds of reasonable prediction." 
(quoting JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 56.7, at I 08 (rev. ed. 2005))). 
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(Second) ofContracts225 and Corbin on Contracts.226 If the amount of the loss must 
be sufficiently foreseeable, it is a greater limitation on the recovery of contract 
damages than tort damages. For example, under tort law's "thin skull," or "eggshell 
skull" doctrine, "[t]he defendant is held liable when the defendant's negligence 
operates upon a concealed physical condition ... to produce consequences which the 
defendant could not reasonably anticipate. The defendant is held liable for unusual 
results of personal injuries which are regarded as unforeseeable .... "227 As stated by 
one court: 
[T]he "thin skull" doctrine is a tort concept that generally does not apply to an 
action for breach of contract. Damages in an action for breach of contract are 
limited to those contemplated by the parties at the time of the agreement, whereas 
the "thin skull" doctrine imposes liability for "quite unforeseeable consequences." 
Therefore, a defendant in an action for breach of contract generally should not be 
held responsible for the unforeseeable consequences of the breach.228 
There is also disagreement on whether each contributing cause must have been 
sufficiently foreseeable, or whether the loss that occurred need only have been 
sufficiently foreseeable. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[i]f 
several circumstances have contributed to a loss, the party in breach is not liable for 
it unless he had reason to foresee all of them."229 One court has stated, however, that 
under "the Restatement . . . the defendant must be able to foresee all of the 
contributing circumstances, not that the defendant must foresee the convergence of 
such circumstances."230 
225 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[A] seller who 
fails to deliver a commodity to a wholesaler is not liable for the wholesaler's loss of profits to the extent 
it is extraordinary .... "); see also id illus. }-7 (permitting recovery for reasonable losses and not 
extraordinarily or unusually large losses). 
226 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 56.7, at 108 (rev. ed. 2005) ("[T]he injury 
actually suffered [still] must be ... an amount that is not beyond the bounds of reasonable prediction."). 
227 Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 900 (Colo. 1992) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 80, § 43, at 
291-92). 
228 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Peiffer, 955 P.2d 1008, IOI I (Colo. 1998) (citation omitted). 
229 RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (emphasis added). 
23° Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 53, 55 (2001). 
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Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, despite being the reporter for the Restatement 
chapter on remedies,231 believed that it "can be asserted with some assurance" that 
"what must be foreseeable is only that the loss would result if the breach occurred. 
There is no requirement that . . . the particular way that the loss came about be 
foreseeable. "232 For example, in Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., the 
plaintiff sued its alarm system provider when the provider failed to respond to an 
alarm at the plaintiffs warehouse, resulting in three burglars stealing inventory and 
then burning down the warehouse, causing the remaining inventory to be lost.233 The 
provider argued that while the theft of inventory was sufficiently foreseeable, 
destruction by arson was not.234 On appeal, the plaintiff confined its argument to the 
largest category ofloss-its lost inventory.235 The court held that whether arson was 
sufficiently foreseeable was irrelevant to determining whether the type of loss was 
sufficiently foreseeable: 
The type or kind of losses at issue was the value of the lost inventory .... [T]o 
recover some damages for loss of inventory, Core-Mark needed only to prove that 
the loss of inventory was foreseeable as a probable result of the breach. [Fn: It 
appears undisputed that this type or kind of loss was foreseeable.] The precise 
manner in which that loss occurred is not relevant to this inquiry. Farnsworth on 
Contracts § 12.14, at 260-61 ("There is no requirement that ... the particular way 
that the loss came about is foreseeable."). That is, to recover some damages for 
loss of inventory, Core-Mark was not required to prove that the fire itself was 
foreseeable. 236 
The court, however, held that the magnitude of the loss must be sufficiently 
foreseeable, and that the foreseeability of the causes of the loss was relevant to that 
issue: 
Core-Mark had the burden of proving that the general magnitude of the claimed 
loss was foreseeable as the probable result of the breach. To contest that element 
231 See Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the "Restitution Interest, " and the Restatement of 
Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2042 n.51 (2001) (noting that Farnsworth was the reporter for the 
remedies chapter of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). 
232 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 795. 
233 Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 370 P.3d 353, 355 (Colo. App. 2016). 
234 Id. at 358. 
235 Id. at 362 n.4. 
236 Id. at 362. 
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of Core-Mark's claim, Sonitrol was entitled to submit evidence showing the 
contrary. One way to do this was to show that the extent of the loss was the result 
of circumstances of which it was not aware or had no reason to be aware. Sonitrol 
tried to do this by presenting evidence of Core-Mark's failure to abide by building 
and fire code provisions regarding storage of flammable materials, the inadequacy 
of the sprinkler system, and, as most relevant for present purposes, the rarity of 
fires resulting from undetected burglaries. In our view, all of that evidence was 
relevant to demonstrate that the extent of Core-Mark's loss was not foreseeable. 
In sum, Core-Mark was required to prove that both the kind and the general 
magnitude of its claimed losses were foreseeable as the probable result of the 
breach. It was not required to prove that any particular cause of the losses was a 
probable result of the breach. But Sonitrol was also entitled to attempt to show 
that the circumstances resulting in the extent of the losses were not sufficiently 
foreseeable; evidence of the rarity of arson in this context was relevant to that 
issue.237 
Although foreseeability is different from causation,238 the relationship between 
the foreseeability requirement and causation is evidenced by the many references to 
the foreseeability requirement as precluding recovery for "remote" losses. 239 This 
237 Id. at 362--63 (footnote omitted). 
238 City ofJackson v. Estate of Stewart ex rel. Womack, 908 So. 2d 703, 713 (Miss. 2005). 
239 See, e.g., Vacuum Indus. Pollution, Inc. v. Union Oil of Cal., 764 F. Supp. 507, 512 (N.D. lll. 1991) 
("In no sense were VIP's far-flung injuries proximately caused by Union Oil's alleged breach of contract. 
Rather, they arc precisely the kind of remote damages not recoverable under the century-old doctrine 
enunciated in Hadley v. Baxendale .... "), ajj"d, 958 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1992); Polidori v. Kordys, 526 
A.2d 230, 235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("[T]he defendant is not chargeable for remote losses, 
'that he did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made."' 
(quoting Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160 (NJ. 1982))); W. Haven Sound Dev. Corp. v. City of West 
Haven, 514 A.2d 734, 742 (Conn. 1986) ("This court has consistently applied the general damage formula 
of Hadleyv. Baxendale to the recovery oflost profits for breach ofcontract, and it is our rule that '[u]nless 
they arc too speculative and remote, prospective profits arc allowable as an clement of damage whenever 
their loss arises directly from and as a natural consequence of the breach."' (quoting Kay Petroleum Corp. 
v. Picrgrossi, 79 A.2d 829, 832 (Conn. 1951))); Ohoud Establishment for Trade & Contracts v. Tri-State 
Contracting & Trading Corp., 1982 A.M.C. 1645, 1655 (D.N.J. 1981) ("Remote and speculative damages 
have been barred since the days of Hadley v. Baxendale." (citation omitted)); Christensen v. Slawter, 343 
P.2d 341, 346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) ("Damages not meeting the test laid down in Hadleyv. Baxendale 
arc said to be remote and not recoverable." (footnote omitted)); Armstrong v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 
152 N.W. 696, 697 (S.D. 1915) ("That the damages are too remote and speculative to admit of their 
recovery can hardly be urged with any degree of earnestness in the light of the holding in Hadley v. 
Baxendale .... "); Milton v. Hudson River Steamboat Co., 37 N.Y. 210, 214 (1867) ("The question of 
proximate or remote damages, was learnedly discussed in the case of ... Hadley v. Baxendale .... "). 
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relationship shows it plays an important role in preventing losses that have multiple 
causes. The foreseeability limitation, however, unlike the other limitations, focuses 
on the time of contract formation.240 
There is also an "intimate relationship between the doctrine of foreseeability 
and the doctrine of avoidable consequences."241 The foreseeability limitation applies 
to any contributing factors, including those that occurred after the breach 
(intervening causes), such as when an injured party's loss is caused by an inability 
to arrange a substitute transaction.242 If it was not sufficiently foreseeable that the 
injured party would be unable to obtain substitute performance (i.e., cover) and 
thereby avoid the loss, recovery for the loss is precluded under the foreseeability 
limitation, even if the injured party made reasonable efforts to arrange a substitute 
transaction and would thus not be precluded from recovery under the avoidability 
limitation. In contrast, if at the time of contract formation the defendant had reason 
to know that the injured party would not be able to avoid the loss, the loss is 
sufficiently foreseeable, even if the reason the loss will be unavoidable is because 
the injured party had not taken adequate pre-breach precautions to mitigate in the 
event of a breach. For example, under Hadley, "defendants would have been liable 
for lost profits of the mill if they had reason to know that no substitute shaft was 
available. "243 
240 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (AM. LAW lNST. 1981) ("Damages are not 
recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the 
breach when the contract was made." (emphasis added)). 
241 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 493 n.8. 
242 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 796 ("Such cases [involving foreseeability] frequently involve an 
issue of avoidability, for it is often questioned whether the party's inability to avoid the loss by arranging 
a substitute transaction was foreseeable."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351 cmt. e (AM. 
LA w lNST. 1981) ("The limitation of foreseeability is often applied in actions for damages for breach of 
contracts to lend money. Because credit is so widely available, a lender often has no reason to foresee at 
the time the contract is made that the borrower will be unable to make substitute arrangements in the event 
of breach."); id. illus. 12 (lender not liable for losses because inability to borrow money to avoid loss was 
insufficiently foreseeable at the time the contract was made). It has been argued that the U.C.C. did away 
with any foreseeability requirement for losses that could not be avoided. Roy Ryden Anderson, Of Mack 
Trucks, Road Bugs, Gilmore and Danzig: Happy Birthday Hadley v. Baxendale, 11 TEX. WESLEY AN L. 
REV. 431, 439-40 (2005). As noted by Professor Anderson, "[i]n significant contrast to the English focus, 
the UCC provision regarding foreseeability for a buyer's recovery of consequential damages requires only 
that the seller at the time of the contract have had 'reason to know' of the buyer's 'general or particular 
requirements' for the seller's performance." Id. at 438-39. 
243 PERILLO, supra note 168, at 507. 
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The foreseeability limitation does, however, play an important role in 
precluding recovery when the injured party's pre-contract or pre-breach fault 
contributed to the loss, because such fault is ordinarily not sufficiently foreseeable. 
In this sense, the foreseeability limitation serves the function previously performed 
by the doctrine of contributory negligence in tort law, albeit in a less direct way. It 
is similar to contributory negligence (rather than comparative negligence) in the 
sense that it has a binary approach to fault: ifthe injured party's fault means that the 
loss was insufficiently foreseeable at the time of contract formation, the injured party 
cannot recover for the loss, rather than apportioning the loss based on the degree of 
contribution to the loss. 
To illustrate, in Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitro/ Corp., the fact that the 
plaintiff's loss from inventory caused by the arson might have been increased by 
"Core-Mark's failure to abide by building and fire code provisions regarding storage 
of flammable materials [and] the inadequacy of the sprinkler system" was relevant 
to whether the magnitude of loss was sufficiently foreseeable.244 In fact, Judge 
Richard Posner has argued that Hadley's animating principle is to preclude a 
recovery by an injured party who could have avoided the loss at a lower cost than 
the breaching party, either before or after contract formation: 
[T]he animating principle of Hadley v. Baxendale ... is that that the costs of the 
untoward consequence of a course of dealings should be borne by that party who 
was able to avert the consequence at least cost and failed to do so. In Hadley the 
untoward consequence was the shutting down of the mill. The carrier could have 
avoided it by delivering the engine shaft on time. But the mill owners, as the court 
noted, could have avoided it simply by having a spare shaft. Prudence required 
that they have a spare shaft anyway, since a replacement could not be obtained at 
once even if there was no undue delay in carting the broken shaft to and the 
replacement shaft from the manufacturer. The court refused to imply a duty on the 
part of the carrier to guarantee the mill owners against the consequences of their 
own lack of prudence, though of course if the parties had stipulated for such a 
guarantee the court would have enforced it. The notice requirement of Hadley v. 
Baxendale is designed to assure that such an improbable guarantee really is 
intended. 245 
244 Core-Mark Midcontincnt Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp., 370 P.3d 353, 362 (Colo. App. 2016). 
245 Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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With respect to interim actions, Posner provided the following hypothetical: 
A commercial photographer purchases a roll of film to take pictures of the 
Himalayas for a magazine. The cost of developing the film is included in the 
purchase price. The photographer incurs heavy expenses (including the hire of an 
airplane) to complete the assignment. He mails the film to the manufacturer but it 
is mislaid in the developing room and never found.246 
Posner argues that the foreseeability limitation "encourages the photographer to take 
adequate post-formation precautions against the loss, such as using two rolls of film 
or requesting special handling when he sends the roll in to be developed."247 He 
believes the photographer can therefore avoid the losses more inexpensively than the 
seller. 248 In general, however, the injured party is not expected to anticipate and 
provide against a loss that would be caused by a breach.249 
Maintaining that the foreseeability limitation is based on sanctioning the 
injured party whose negligence contributed to the loss would nevertheless be an 
overstatement. In most cases involving consequential losses the injured party will 
not have acted negligently, and it is not even clear that having a spare crank.shaft 
would have been the optimal level of care in Hadley. 25° Further, the Hadley court did 
not rely on the lack of a spare crankshaft to show that the injured party's fault 
contributed to the loss. Rather, it referenced the spare crankshaft to show that the 
probability ofloss from breach was not sufficiently foreseeable.251 Additionally, the 
foreseeability limitation applies to unexpected contributing factors that were not 
caused by the injured party.252 
Rather, the rule is based on the fact that "[a] contracting party is generally 
expected to take account of those risks that are foreseeable at the time he makes the 
246 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 127 (6th ed. 2003). 
241 Id. 
24s Id. 
249 City of Richmond v. Cheatwood, 107 S.E. 830, 834-35 (Va. 1921). 
250 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle a/Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 563, 582 (1992). 
251 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 [151]. 
252 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. c illus. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(injured party's inability to cover on short notice). 
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contract."253 This cryptic explanation of using foreseeability of loss as a basis for 
responsibility reflects an attempt to balance two conflicting principles. The first is 
that a breaching party should pay an amount of damages that will put the injured 
party in the position it would have been in had the breaching party performed as 
promised.254 Importantly, this position is "the actual worth of the contract to him 
rather than to some reasonable person [and should therefore] take account of any 
special circumstances that are peculiar to the situation of the injured party, including 
his personal values and even his idiosyncrasies, as well as his own needs and 
opportunities."255 The second is that a breaching party should not face unlimited 
responsibility for all losses its breach might cause, particularly because there is strict 
liability for breach.256 This latter concern is not only driven by notions of fairness, 
but by the belief "that the economy cannot flourish when businesses are afraid to 
enter into transactions because they fear an inadvertent breach will lead to a huge 
damage award."257 
The foreseeability rule strikes a compromise, placing the burden on the 
defendant, when the loss is sufficiently foreseeable to the defendant, to expressly 
disclaim responsibility at the time of contract formation or else be responsible for 
such a loss. It places the burden on the injured party, when the loss is insufficiently 
foreseeable to the defendant, to obtain express agreement from the defendant, at the 
time of contract formation, to accept responsibility for any unforeseeable losses 
(such as through a liquidated-damages clause). 
Though not perfect, the Hadley rule is a reasonable solution to the competing 
principles it seeks to balance, creating a generally appropriate standard for 
determining which party should have responsibility during negotiations for raising 
253 Id. cmt. a. 
254 See id. § 347 ("[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest .... "); see 
also id. § 344(a) (defining expectation interest as an injured party's "interest in having the benefit of his 
bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed"). 
255 Id. § 344 cmt. b; see also id. § 347 cmt. b ("If defective or partial performance is rendered, the loss in 
value caused by the breach is equal to the difference between the value that the performance would have 
had if there had been no breach and the value of such performance as was actually rendered. In principle, 
this requires a determination of the values of those performances to the injured party himself and not their 
values to some hypothetical reasonable person on some market. They therefore depend on his own 
particular circumstances or those of his enterprise .... "). 
256 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 48 (1974). 
257 Lloyd, supra note 172, at 15. 
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the issue of liability for particular losses. 258 Because of the beliefs that: a breaching 
party should ordinarily pay for losses caused by the breach,259 a party "is generally 
expected to take account of those risks that are foreseeable at the time he makes the 
contract"260 and can demand greater compensation to account for those risks, and 
that parties will often tacitly agree to be liable for sufficiently foreseeable risks,261 it 
is reasonable to place the burden of disclaiming liability for those risks on the 
defendant. Because, however, the defendant cannot account for risks that are 
insufficiently foreseeable to it, it is reasonable to place the burden on the injured 
party to obtain assent from the defendant to be responsible for any such losses. 
The result of using foreseeability to determine which party should have 
responsibility for raising the issue during negotiations not only mimics what many 
parties likely intended, but it also has the benefit of encouraging injured parties to 
disclose their special circumstances to the defendant so that the defendant can 
accurately assess the risk of breach262 and discouraging injured parties from acting 
negligently.263 For example, the foreseeability limitation encourages not only the 
disclosure of special circumstances to shift the risk of loss from such special 
circumstances to the defendant, it encourages a plaintiff to take reasonable 
precautions to avoid the breach from causing a loss. The foreseeable probability of 
loss will be based on the assumption the plaintiff has taken such measures. In this 
respect, it plays an important role in policing the plaintiff's negligent pre-breach 
behavior (an intrinsic, existing cause or an intrinsic, interim cause) that is not 
258 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
("Except for the restrictions imposed by the rule that proscribes the fixing of penalties parties are free to 
vary the rules governing damages, subject to the usual limitations on private agreement such as that on 
unconscionable contracts or terms .... " (citations omitted)). 
259 See id. ("The initial assumption is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for his actual 
loss. This is reflected in the general measure of damages .... ");see also id. § 347 cmt. c ("Subject to the 
limitations stated in§§ 350-53, the injured party is entitled to recover for all losses actually suffered."). 
260 Id. § 351 cmt. a. 
261 See Daniel P. O'Gorman, When Lightning Strikes: Hadley v. Baxendale's Probability Standard 
Applied to Long-Shot Contracts, 47 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 859, 881-83 (2016) (arguing that the Hadley rule 
might be used as a proxy for determining the parties' intentions). 
262 See id at 904. 
263 See id. at 894. 
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addressed by the mitigation doctrine, which only applies once there has been a breach 
or repudiation (an intrinsic, intervening cause). 264 
Of course, using a single factor-foreseeable probability of loss at the time of 
contract formation-to determine responsibility in the absence of agreement 
otherwise leads to some surprising results. For example, recovery is denied for the 
loss suffered from the breach of a contract to provide a customer with a ticket to bet 
on the outcome of a horse race when it turns out it would have been a winning ticket, 
because the chance of winning was too low.265 And recovery is permitted when a 
ship owner delivers goods (sugar) late and the charterer lost a resale profit because 
the market price dropped between the due date for delivery and the actual delivery, 
even though the market price was just as likely to go up as down and there was no 
evidence the charter had been hedging against a change in market price.266 Thus, the 
low probability ofloss leads to no recovery in a case where the parties likely intended 
the defendant to insure against the loss, and a high probability of loss leads to 
recovery in a case where the parties likely intended the defendant to not insure 
against the loss. The ticket seller thus has no incentive to ensure that the correct 
tickets are provided to a customer, even though the buyer probably would have been 
willing to pay a small amount of extra money to insure against the loss. And the ship 
owner has an incentive to only consider the possible loss from breach-not the 
possible gain from breach-when deciding on the amount to spend to ensure timely 
performance. This encourages excessive precautions, even though the charterer 
likely would not be willing to pay extra to insure against a short delay. 
Placing the burden on an unsophisticated party, who might assume all losses 
caused by breach can be recovered, will also lead to some unfair results. Thus, 
requiring the ticket buyer to bear the risk of the loss seems more unfair than requiring 
the carrier to bear the risk of the loss.267 Similarly, in some cases, the low price 
charged by the defendant might indicate it was not sufficiently aware that it would 
be responsible for a very large foreseeable loss if it breaches, a concern that has led 
264 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 cmt. e, illus. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also 
id. § 350 cmt. b (noting that a party is expected to take reasonable actions to avoid loss "[ o ]nee a party 
has reason to know that performance by the other party will not be forthcoming"). 
265 Offenberger v. Beulah Park Jockey Club, Inc., No. 79AP-471, 1979 WL 209570 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 28, 1979). 
266 See generally Kaufos v. C. Czamikow (Heron JI) [1967) 3 All. ER 686 (HL) (Eng.). 
267 See Avery W. Katz, Contract Theory-Who Needs It?, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2043, 2076 n.32 (2014) 
(noting that it has been argued "that the principle of Hadley v Baxendale should be replaced by a less 
restrictive model that allows for greater recovery by unsophisticated parties"). 
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the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and some courts to adopt a disproportionality 
doctrine that permits a court to deny recovery when the amount of loss is 
disproportionate to the contract price. 268 
The foreseeability limitation is also a blunt instrument for sanctioning the 
injured party for pre-breach negligent conduct that contributed to the loss. For 
example, in Hadley the issue would not be whether it was negligent for the miller to 
not have a spare crankshaft; the issue would be the likelihood the miller would not 
have a spare crankshaft. Thus, if a particular form of negligent behavior is common, 
then negligence could be sufficiently foreseeable. Accordingly, Learned Hand's 
famous statement in The TJ. Hooper about what is common practice never being 
dispositive of reasonable behavior,269 would not apply in a foreseeability analysis. 
And if a particular form of risk-averse behavior is common then a loss caused in part 
by the injured party's risk neutral behavior might not have been sufficiently 
foreseeable. 
The rough edges of the foreseeability limitation, however, are simply a product 
of its "ruleness," and the parties' ability to expressly disclaim or assume liability for 
a particular loss softens some of the rule's rough edges. Also, although it might seem 
unusual for a party to assume the risk of another party's negligence, thereby 
suggesting that the defendant would always contract out of such liability if the matter 
were negotiated, in some situations it would make sense to accept the risk. If the 
expected loss is a factor of the chance of breach multiplied by the chance of loss if 
there is a breach multiplied by the amount of loss in the event of breach, the 
defendant might be able to more cost-effectively reduce the chance of breach than 
the injured party can reduce the chance of loss if there is a breach. Essentially, what 
would have been negligence is no longer negligence because the defendant 
presumably has adjusted its level of precautions to make the cost to the injured party 
ofreducing the chance ofloss if there is a breach inefficient. 
The point is that in many situations it will be unclear which party would have 
agreed to assume the risk of a particular loss if the matter had been negotiated. 
Requiring the defendant to disclaim liability when the loss is sufficiently foreseeable 
and requiring the injured party to obtain the defendant's agreement to assume the 
268 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also Larry T. 
Garvin, Disproportiona/ity and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive 
Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 345--60 (1998) (discussing the disproportionality doctrine in the courts). 
269 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
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risk when it is not sufficiently foreseeable is as reasonable a division of responsibility 
for raising the issue as any other, at the level of generality adopted by the rule. 
Ill. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CAUSATION 
ISSUES IN CONTRACT LAW 
This Part sets forth a coherent framework for analyzing causation issues in 
contract cases. Such a framework should take into account the starting assumption 
of contract damages-full compensation-and recognize that the exceptions are just 
that---exceptions.270 At the same time, it should take account of the fact that it is 
typically considered more difficult to recover contract damages than tort damages271 
and that contract damages should not be punitive.272 Each doctrine should have a 
single, distinct function that does not overlap with the function of any of the other 
doctrines. The doctrines should also have a common approach to causation. For 
example, if a strict standard is applied to one of the doctrines, the failure to apply a 
strict standard to the other doctrines should be justified. The first section in this Part 
will explain the appropriate roles played by each doctrine in a causation analysis, 
and the second section will address the appropriate test for each doctrine. 
A. The Appropriate Role Played by Each Doctrine 
The role played by each doctrine has previously been discussed, and this section 
therefore need only set forth those roles in summary fashion. When there are multiple 
factors potentially causing a particular type of loss, and the issue is whether the 
defendant's breach was the cause in fact of the type ofloss, the court should apply 
the general causation requirement provided the other potential factor was not an 
intrinsic, intervening cause. When the issue involves the amount or extent of a 
particular type of loss, the court should apply the certainty requirement, unless the 
issue is whether an intrinsic, intervening cause increased the amount or extent of the 
loss. When the issue involves multiple factors potentially causing a particular type 
ofloss or increasing the amount or extent of the loss, and the factor other than breach 
is an intrinsic, intervening factor, the court should apply the avoidability doctrine 
rather than the general causation requirement or the certainty requirement. And the 
270 See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("The 
initial assumption is that the injured party is entitled to full compensation for his actual loss. This is 
reflected in the general measure of damages ... . ");see also id. § 347 cmt. c ("Subject to the limitations 
stated in §§ 350--53, the injured party is entitled to recover for all losses actually suffered."). 
271 See, e.g., id. § 352 cmt. a ("Courts have traditionally required greater certainty in the proof of damages 
for breach of a contract than in the proof of damages for a tort."). 
272 See id. § 355 ("Punitive damages arc not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct 
constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages arc recoverable."). 
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court should always apply the foreseeability test with respect to any loss, even if one 
or more of the other doctrines also applies. 
Thus, the first two doctrines (general causation requirement and the certainty 
limitation) are mutually exclusive in that they address different causation issues (type 
ofloss versus amount ofloss). The first two doctrines and the avoidability doctrine 
are mutually exclusive because they deal with causes arising at different times 
(existing and interim versus intervening) and avoidability is limited to intrinsic 
causes. The foreseeability doctrine always applies because even if the loss is 
recoverable under the first three doctrines, the loss cannot be recovered if it was not 
sufficiently foreseeable to the defendant at the time of contract formation. The first 
two doctrines (general causation requirement and the certainty limitation) are about 
factual causation. A voidability is about both factual causation and whether the 
injured party should be held responsible for a loss it helped cause. Foreseeability is 
about whether the defendant should be responsible for a loss it in fact caused. 
B. The Substance of the Doctrines 
As previously discussed, there is considerable disagreement among courts and 
commentators regarding the substance of each doctrine. Each of the doctrines can be 
applied in a way to increase or decrease the injured party's chance of recovering for 
a particular loss. Unfortunately, because courts and commentators often fail to 
recognize that each doctrine addresses a different aspect of the same issue-
causation-they typically fail to appreciate that the doctrines should be applied in a 
similar fashion, irrespective of whether it is in a way that increases or decreases the 
chance ofrecovering for a particular loss. Also, they often fail to recognize that some 
of the competing tests are unnecessary because the concerns addressed by the test 
are handled by another doctrine. 
With respect to whether to apply a but-for standard or a substantial-factor 
standard to the general causation requirement, it does not take long to recognize that 
the substantial-factor test should be banished from contract law. Tort law has much 
more experience with the substantial-factor test than contract law, and ifthe ALI has 
concluded that it should be discarded from tort law because it is confusing and has 
been misapplied, there is little reason to retain it in contract law. 
Also, the version of the substantial-factor test that permits proof of causation 
when the injured party cannot establish but-for causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence is particularly unsuited for contract law for several reasons. First, it is 
generally considered that there should be less responsibility for a loss in contract law 
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than tort law. 273 Second, proof of causation in contract law is not as difficult as some 
other areas of law, and a lower standard than but-for proof is therefore unnecessary. 
For example, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law 
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin,274 in a so-called mixed motives case the employee need only 
establish that the unlawful motive was a "motivating factor" in the decision, not the 
but-for cause.275 Such an easing of the causation requirement is justified by the 
importance of deterring employment discrimination.276 Also, employment 
discrimination is based on motive, and proving a counterfactual involving multiple 
motives by the decision maker is more difficult than proving a counterfactual 
involving multiple events. Accordingly, there is insufficient justification for a 
general rule permitting an injured party in a breach-of-contract action to recover for 
a loss that the injured party proved was a substantial factor in the loss, but could not 
prove was a but-for cause of the loss. 
With respect to multiple, sufficient causes, provided that multiple parties 
breached the contract, and each breach was sufficient to cause the loss (and thus 
neither a "but for" cause of the loss), it is appropriate to hold each defendant liable, 
273 See, e.g., id.§ 352 cmt. aRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
("Courts have traditionally required greater certainty in the proof of damages for breach of a contract than 
in the proof of damages for a tort."). 
274 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I). 
275 See id. ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchaptcr, an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was 
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."); 
see also id. § 2000e-5 ("On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) 
of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court-{i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive 
relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly 
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000c-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award 
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, 
described in subparagraph (A)."); Univ. ofTex. SW. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522-23 (2013) 
("An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link 
between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called 
but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the 
employer's motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the 
employer's decision."). 
276 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing 
deterrent effect as support for using substantial-factor test, rather than but-for test, in Title VII). 
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as courts currently do.277 Absolving each party from liability would result in the 
injured party receiving no compensation, leaving the injured party in a worse position 
than if each party had performed. Precluding recovery would also discourage parties 
from contracting with multiple parties for a single project, even though doing so 
might otherwise be efficient. 
Liability should not apply, however, ifthe breach was a sufficient cause but the 
loss would have occurred because of factors other than another party's breach. 
Permitting a recovery in such a situation would result in overcompensation. 
Although there are limited situations in which the court will permit 
overcompensation, those rationales do not apply here. First, in a case involving 
defective or unfinished construction and where loss in value cannot be proved with 
sufficient certainty, an injured party can recover the cost of completion provided the 
defendant does not prove such amount is clearly disproportionate to the loss in value 
to the injured party.278 Possible overcompensation is tolerated because of concern 
that the alternative (diminution in value) would be under-compensation.279 Second, 
courts will enforce reasonable stipulated-damages clauses, even if the loss that 
actually occurred was less than the stipulated amount.28° Courts do so because such 
clauses avoid incurring the expense of litigating the amount of loss. 281 There is also 
at least one situation in which the court will permit a recovery even though the 
injured party cannot prove but-for causation. If a party's promise is conditioned on 
a fortuitous event, and the breach occurs before the fortuitous event and it is uncertain 
whether the event would have occurred, the injured party may recover damages 
based on the value of the promise. 282 
Thus, there are limited and well-defined situations in which overcompensation 
is permitted or in which but-for causation is not required. But the fact that these are 
well-recognized exceptions demonstrates that a general substantial-factor test, 
277 See Cal. & Haw. Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc., 794 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), amending opinion on 
denial of rehearing, 811F.2d1264 (9th Cir. 1987). 
278 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 348(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
279 See id. cmt. c ("Even if this gives him a recovery somewhat in excess of the loss in value to him, it is 
better that he receive a small windfall than that he be undercompcnsated by being limited to the resulting 
diminution in the market price of his property."). 
280 Id. § 356(1 ). 
281 id. emt. a ("The enforcement of such provisions for liquidated damages saves the time of courts, juries, 
parties[,] and witnesses and reduces the expenses of litigation."). 
282 Id. § 348(3). 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) •DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2017.472 
http://lawrcview.law.pitt.edu 
CONTRACTS, CAUSATION, AND CLARITY 
PAGE I 323 
applied in a way to permit recovery despite being unable to prove but-for causation, 
is inconsistent with the general remedial scheme in contract law. Applying the 
substantial-factor test in a situation involving multiple, necessary causes would also 
be inconsistent with the expectation remedy because it would put the injured party 
in a better position than if there had been performance. 
With respect to cases of fortuitous loss, tort law precludes recovery in such 
cases and there is no reason contract law should permit such recovery.283 Thus, if the 
defendant's breach was the but-for cause of the loss, but the defendant's breach did 
not increase the risk ofloss, there should ordinarily be no recovery. Again, if tort law 
does not permit the recovery, there is insufficient justification to permit the recovery 
in contract law. These issues need not, however, be addressed in the causation 
analysis, but can be adequately addressed in the foreseeability analysis. In many of 
these cases the loss will not have been sufficiently foreseeable. For example, in a 
case like Zetter v. Griffith Aviation, Inc. 284 the foreseeability limitation would 
preclude liability. At the time of entering into the contract, the employer had no 
reason to believe that using a different airplane would increase the risk of a crash.285 
But Kaufos v. C. Czarnikow (Heron /1)286-the case previously discussed 
involving the late delivery of sugar-might provide an example of a fortuitous loss 
case where the loss was held sufficiently foreseeable. In Heron II, the chance that 
the market price for sugar would be lower on the date of a later delivery than on the 
date of a timely delivery was found to be sufficiently foreseeable, a conclusion not 
open to serious dispute unless one requires that the likelihood of loss be probable. 
The possibility of this case being a fortuitous loss case can be shown with some 
assumptions. Assume that the buyer's only reason for wanting the sugar to arrive by 
the specified date was because the buyer wanted to sell the sugar sooner rather than 
later, and not because the buyer had information that the market price for sugar would 
drop after that date. Rather, assume that no one could predict the fluctuations in the 
market price for sugar, and that the price was as likely to go up as it was to go down, 
but that market fluctuations were common. In such a situation, if a late delivery 
causes the buyer to make less money than it would have if the sugar had been 
delivered on time, the buyer's loss is fortuitous, but the foreseeability limitation will 
not preclude a recovery because the drop was sufficiently foreseeable. But the loss 
283 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 95, at 180 (explaining that tort law docs not permit a recovery for a 
fortuitous loss). 
284 Zcttcr v. Griffith Aviation, Inc., No. CTV.A. 603-218-DCR, 2006 WL 1117678, at *I I (E.D. Ky. 
Apr. 25, 2006). 
285 See generally id. 
286 Herron II [1967] 3 All. ER 686 (HL) (Eng.). 
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was no less fortuitous than the plane crash in Zetter. Also, by permitting a recovery 
for such a fortuitous loss, particularly when it is sufficiently foreseeable, the carrier 
will have an incentive to engage in inefficient expenditures to avoid a late delivery, 
thereby raising the price for performance. 
This is easily demonstrated. Assume the following: The carrier's cost of 
delivering the goods on time is $120. The carrier's cost ofa late delivery is $80. A 
late delivery will not cause the buyer a loss other than a possible decrease in market 
price. At any given time, there is a 50% chance the market price of the sugar to be 
delivered will be $400 and a 50% chance it will be $600. Under current law, if the 
market price is $600 on the day set for delivery, but $400 on the actual late delivery 
date, then the carrier owes the buyer $200 in damages for the lost profit. The chance 
of this happening will be 25% (50% chance the price will be $600 on the scheduled 
delivery day and 50% chance it will then be $400 on the day set for delivery). Thus, 
the carrier's anticipated loss from a late delivery is $50 ($200 loss times 25% chance 
ofloss occurring). The carrier, however, can avoid the $50 expected loss by spending 
an extra $.i!O and ensuring timely delivery. Thus, the carrier will have an incentive to 
spend $40 even though the expected loss to the buyer from a late delivery is $0. The 
carrier will then charge the buyer an extra $40, which presumably everyone else will 
charge as well, and the buyer will in essence be forced to purchase insurance for a 
late delivery even though the buyer does not desire such insurance. Although the 
parties could agree that the seller will not be liable for a market price drop caused by 
a late delivery, it does not make sense to have a default rule that is different from 
what the parties would typically want. 
Recovery of fortuitous losses is permitted, however, as long as the loss was 
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of contract formation. In fact, Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which applies to "transactions in goods,"287 bases many 
of its remedies upon the market price of the goods at or around the time of the 
breach. 288 Thus, under current law, the breaching party assumes the risk of a change 
in the market price, even if the price was as likely to change in one direction as the 
other. Although such results appear at odds with the tort law concept that there should 
be no recovery for a fortuitous loss, the examples provided of such situations involve 
highly unlikely consequences (being struck by lightning), for which contract law's 
foreseeability limitation would preclude recovery. For fortuitous losses that were 
sufficiently foreseeable (like a change in market price), it is reasonable to assume 
that the parties are tacitly agreeing to be liable for such a loss, and the foreseeability 
of the loss makes it fair to require the prospective party in breach to disclaim liability. 
287 U.C.C. § 2-102. 
288 Id.§§ 2-708(1), 2-713(1). 
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Also, proving that the breach did not in fact increase the risk of loss would often 
present a difficult factual issue, thereby increasing the cost oflitigation. Accordingly, 
there does not appear to be sufficient justification to extend the exclusion of recovery 
for fortuitous losses to situations in which the loss was sufficiently foreseeable. If 
the parties desire to disclaim liability, they are free to make such an agreement. 
To the extent that the substantial-factor test is used to absolve a defendant 
whose breach contributed to the loss in only a trivial way (butterfly-effect or 
overwhelming-force cases), the foreseeability limitation largely addresses that 
concern as well, provided that the amount of loss and any contributing factors must 
be sufficiently foreseeable. While such an analysis might be appropriate in tort law 
where the parties do not have an opportunity to bargain in advance about 
responsibility for the loss, such an analysis is inappropriate for a situation in which 
the parties did have an opportunity to negotiate regarding the scope of risk. As one 
court stated, "[b ]ecause of the limiting doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 
apportionment has not been a concern in contract cases."289 Using the substantial-
factor test for butterfly-effect or overwhelming-force cases creates confusion as to 
the proper test that should be used to address such situations. The foreseeability 
limitation was designed to address cases involving remote causes, and thus there is 
no need to adopt a substantial-factor test for such a case. 
With respect to proving the amount of loss to a reasonable certainty, courts 
should equate "reasonable certainty" with proving the amount by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and not a higher standard of proof, such as clear and convincing 
evidence. If courts apply the foreseeability limitation to the amount of loss, it would 
be unnecessary to apply a heightened standard when the amount of loss is large; the 
foreseeability analysis will address such situations. Also, because the typical 
standard of proof in a civil action is preponderance of the evidence, justification is 
necessary to impose, as a general rule, a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
Also, the same standard should apply both to proving that the type ofloss was caused 
by the breach and the amount of the loss because each asks essentially the same 
question-what loss did the defendant's breach cause? 
The only justification that has been provided for a heightened standard is that a 
clear and convincing evidence standard would operate as a penalty default rule, 
encouraging the injured party to disclose the amount of its expected loss, with parties 
then agreeing to a liquidated-damages provision.290 It is uncertain, however, that 
adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard will encourage more parties to 
289 Reiman Assocs., Inc. v. RIA Advcr., Inc., 306 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981). 
290 See Carleton, supra note 170. 
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discuss damages during negotiations. If the loss from breach is difficult to determine, 
the prospective injured party already has a strong incentive to seek a liquidated-
damages provision, even if the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 
Also, adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard as a penalty default rule 
will disproportionately affect unsophisticated parties, who will not be aware of the 
heighted standard of proof Accordingly, the amount of the loss should only have to 
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
With respect to mitigation, its distinctive feature is precluding recovery even 
when the defendant's breach was a but-for and sufficiently foreseeable cause of the 
loss. For example, if a failure to mitigate was analyzed under the other doctrines, the 
fact that the injured party's failure to mitigate was a necessary cause of the loss would 
not prevent the defendant from being held liable as long as the defendant's breach 
was also a necessary cause and the failure to mitigate was sufficiently foreseeable. 
Thus, the injured party's failure to mitigate after breach is treated more seriously 
than other causes, including post-breach intrinsic causes such as the injured party's 
negligence. The question is whether such special treatment is warranted. 
With respect to treating a failure to mitigate as a contributing factor that 
automatically precludes recovery, such special treatment is arguably justified 
because once there is a breach or repudiation, the injured party is much more aware 
of the possibility of losses than prior to breach or repudiation. One would expect 
greater efforts from an injured party to avoid loss once it becomes clear a loss will 
likely occur, than prior to breach or repudiation when the assumption is that the other 
party will perform. Also, a stricter mitigation standard provides an incentive to the 
defendant to promptly inform the plaintiff of the breach or repudiation because upon 
notice the plaintiff's negligence will be more likely to preclude a recovery. 
With respect to the foreseeability limitation, if the limitation is designed to 
place the burden on the defendant to account for those risks that are sufficiently 
foreseeable, there is no basis for distinguishing between the type of loss and the 
amount of loss, as some courts do. If a party is not responsible for an unforeseeable 
type of loss, it is because the defendant was not expected to factor that loss into the 
expected cost of breach. Refusing to extend the foreseeability limitation to the 
amount or extent ofloss, however, suggests that the defendant was expected to factor 
in an unexpectedly large loss as long as the type of loss was foreseeable, a non 
sequitur. Properly assessing a risk requires a party to identify both the possibility of 
the type of loss and the expected amount of loss. An unforeseeably large loss is 
different only in kind from an unforeseeable type of loss, but not different in effect. 
Requiring that the amount of loss be sufficiently foreseeable also has the effect of 
not tempting courts to avoid liability in such cases by applying a strict standard of 
reasonable certainty, a standard that would deviate from the typical standard of proof 
in civil actions. 
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Likewise, if the foreseeability limitation is based on the premise that the 
defendant is expected to account for those risks that are foreseeable but is not 
expected to account for those that are not, the defendant should not be expected to 
account for contributing factors that were not sufficiently foreseeable. In other 
words, each contributing factor should be sufficiently foreseeable. Although this 
would result in the defendant avoiding responsibility even though the risk of the type 
of loss was sufficiently foreseeable and the amount of loss was sufficiently 
foreseeable, simply because one of the contributing factors was unforeseeable, other 
factors that would contribute to the loss are typically more within the injured party's 
control or at least the injured party is more likely to have knowledge of them. 
Accordingly, such a rule encourages injured parties to either disclose such special 
circumstances or to take reasonable precautions, including not engaging in negligent 
behavior. Also, ex ante, the injured party would most likely not have wanted to pay 
additional money to cover a loss caused by multiple factors when at least one was. 
unforeseeable. The defendant, not knowing how much more likely the loss is, is not 
in a good position to assess the additional liability, and is likely to demand more 
compensation than necessary. 
With respect to the necessary degree of foreseeability, the issue does not 
involve determining the existence of a fact, where a "probable" standard might be 
presumed to be appropriate. Rather, one is dealing with when a party should be 
expected to account for a risk. Under this approach, the "probable" standard set forth 
in Hadley and adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is hard to defend. 
Is it reasonable to conclude that a risk of an event occurring should not be accounted 
for whenever its chance of occurring is 50% or less? Thus, the standard should 
simply be whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have 
accounted for the risk of the event occurring when deciding on the terms of the 
contract, including the price to charge. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As in tort law, contract law cases can involve complicated issues of causation. 
By addressing causation issues under multiple doctrines, it is often difficult to 
determine which doctrine applies to a particular issue. Courts have also applied 
differing standards to the causation doctrines and usually fail to justify the use of the 
particular standard selected. This Article has sought to clarify which doctrines apply 
to particular causation issues and to set forth the appropriate standard for each 
doctrine. 
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